1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2009
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
GRANITE ROCK CO. v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHER-
HOOD OF TEAMSTERS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 08–1214. Argued January 19, 2010—Decided June 24, 2010
In June 2004, respondent local union (Local), supported by its parent international (IBT), initiated a strike against petitioner Granite Rock, the employer of some of Local’s members, following the expira-tion of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) and an im-passe in their negotiations. On July 2, the parties agreed to a new CBA containing no-strike and arbitration clauses, but could not reach a separate back-to-work agreement holding local and international union members harmless for any strike-related damages Granite Rock incurred. IBT instructed Local to continue striking until Gran-ite Rock approved such a hold-harmless agreement, but the company refused to do so, informing Local that continued strike activity would violate the new CBA’s no-strike clause. IBT and Local responded by announcing a company-wide strike involving numerous facilities and workers, including members of other IBT locals.
Granite Rock sued IBT and Local, invoking federal jurisdiction under §301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), seeking strike-related damages for the unions’ alleged breach of con-tract, and asking for an injunction against the ongoing strike because the hold-harmless dispute was an arbitrable grievance under the new CBA. The unions conceded §301(a) jurisdiction, but asserted that the new CBA was never validly ratified by a vote of Local’s members, and, thus, the CBA’s no-strike clause did not provide a basis for Granite Rock to challenge the strike. After Granite Rock amended its complaint to add claims that IBT tortiously interfered with the new CBA, the unions moved to dismiss. The District Court granted IBT’s motion to dismiss the tortious interference claims on the ground that §301(a) supports a federal cause of action only for breach
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of contract. But the court denied Local’s separate motion to send the parties’ dispute over the CBA’s ratification date to arbitration, ruling that a jury should decide whether ratification occurred on July 2, as Granite Rock contended, or on August 22, as Local alleged. After the jury concluded that the CBA was ratified on July 2, the court ordered arbitration to proceed on Granite Rock’s breach-of-contract claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the tortious interference claims, but reversed the arbitration order, holding that the parties’ratification-date dispute was a matter for an arbitrator to resolve un-der the CBA’s arbitration clause. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the clause covered the ratification-date dispute because the clause clearly covered the related strike claims; national policy favoring ar-bitration required ambiguity about the arbitration clause’s scope to be resolved in favor of arbitrability; and, in any event, Granite Rock had implicitly consented to arbitrate the ratification-date dispute by suing under the contract.
Held:
1. The parties’ dispute over the CBA’s ratification date was a mat-ter for the District Court, not an arbitrator, to resolve. Pp. 6–20.
(a) Whether parties have agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute is typically an “ ‘ issue for judicial determination,’ ” e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U. S. 79, 83, as is a dispute over an arbitration contract’s formation, see, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 944. These principles would neatly dispose of this case if the formation dispute here were typical. But it is not. It is based on when (not whether) the new CBA containing the parties’ arbitration clause was ratified and thereby formed. To de-termine whether the parties’ dispute over the CBA’s ratification date is arbitrable, it is necessary to apply the rule that a court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only when satisfied that the par-ties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. See, e.g., id., at 943. To satisfy itself that such agreement exists, the court must resolve any issue that calls into question the specific arbitration clause that a party seeks to have the court enforce. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, ante, at 4–6. Absent an agreement committing them to an arbitrator, such issues typically concern the scope and enforceability of the parties’ arbitration clause. In addition, such issues always in-clude whether the clause was agreed to, and may include when that agreement was formed. Pp. 6–7.
(b) In cases invoking the “federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes,” Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U. S. 368, 377, courts adhere to the same framework, see, e.g., AT&T Technolo-gies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, and discharge their duty to satisfy themselves that the parties agreed to arbitrate a
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particular dispute by (1) applying the presumption of arbitrability only where a validly formed and enforceable arbitration agreement is ambiguous about whether it covers the dispute at hand and (2) order-ing arbitration only where the presumption is not rebutted, see, e.g., id., at 651–652. Local is thus wrong to suggest that the presumption takes courts outside the settled framework for determining arbitra-bility. This Court has never held that the presumption overrides the principle that a court may submit to arbitration “only those disputes . . . the parties have agreed to submit,” First Options, supra, at 943, nor that courts may use policy considerations as a substitute for party agreement, see, e.g., AT&T Technologies, supra, at 648?651. The presumption should be applied only where it reflects, and derives its legitimacy from, a judicial conclusion (absent a provision validly committing the issue to an arbitrator) that arbitration of a particular dispute is what the parties intended because their express agreement to arbitrate was validly formed, is legally enforceable, and is best con-strued to encompass the dispute. See, e.g., First Options, supra, at 944–945. This simple framework compels reversal of the Ninth Cir-cuit’s judgment because it requires judicial resolution of two related questions central to Local’s arbitration demand: when the CBA was formed, and whether its arbitration clause covers the matters Local wishes to arbitrate. Pp. 7–13.
(c) The parties characterize their ratification-date dispute as a formation dispute because a union vote ratifying the CBA’s terms was necessary to form the contract. For purposes of determining ar-bitrability, when a contract is formed can be as critical as whether it was formed. That is so where, as here, an agreement’s ratification date determines its formation date, and thus determines whether its provisions were enforceable during the period relevant to the parties’dispute. This formation date question requires judicial resolution here because it relates to Local’s arbitration demand in a way that required the District Court to determine the CBA’s ratification date in order to decide whether the parties consented to arbitrate the mat-ters the demand covered. The CBA requires arbitration only of dis-putes that “arise under” the agreement. The parties’ ratification-date dispute does not clearly fit that description. But the Ninth Circuit credited Local’s argument that the ratification-date dispute should be presumed arbitrable because it relates to a dispute (the no-strike dis-pute) that does clearly “arise under” the CBA. The Ninth Circuit overlooked the fact that this theory of the ratification-date dispute’s arbitrability fails if, as Local asserts, the new CBA was not formed until August 22, because in that case there was no CBA for the July no-strike dispute to “arise under.” Local attempts to address this flaw in the Circuit’s reasoning by arguing that a December 2004
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document the parties executed rendered the new CBA effective as of May 1, 2004, the date the prior CBA expired. The Court of Appeals did not rule on this claim, and this Court need not do so either be-cause it was not raised in Local’s brief in opposition to the certiorari petition. Pp. 13–17.
(d) Another reason to reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment is that the ratification-date dispute, whether labeled a formation dis-pute or not, falls outside the arbitration clause’s scope on grounds the presumption favoring arbitration cannot cure. CBA §20 provides, in-ter alia, that “[a]ll disputes arising under this agreement shall be re-solved in accordance with the [Grievance] procedure,” which includes arbitration. The parties’ ratification-date dispute cannot properly be said to fall within this provision’s scope for at least two reasons. First, the question whether the CBA was validly ratified on July 2, 2004—a question concerning the CBA’s very existence—cannot fairly be said to “arise under” the CBA. Second, even if the “arising under” language could in isolation be construed to cover this dispute, §20’s remaining provisions all but foreclose such a reading by describing that section’s arbitration requirement as applicable to labor dis-agreements that are addressed in the CBA and are subject to its re-quirement of mandatory mediation. The Ninth Circuit’s contrary conclusion finds no support in §20’s text. That court’s only effort to grapple with that text misses the point by focusing on whether Gran-ite Rock’s claim to enforce the CBA’s no-strike provisions could be characterized as “arising under” the agreement, which is not the dis-positive issue here. Pp. 17–18.
(e) Local’s remaining argument in support of the Court of Ap-peals’ judgment—that Granite Rock “implicitly” consented to arbitra-tion when it sued to enforce the CBA’s no-strike and arbitrable griev-ance provisions—is similarly unavailing. Although it sought an injunction against the strike so the parties could arbitrate the labor grievance giving rise to it, Granite Rock’s decision to sue does not es-tablish an agreement, “implicit” or otherwise, to arbitrate an issue (the CBA’s formation date) that the company did not raise and has always rightly characterized as beyond the arbitration clause’s scope. Pp. 19–20.
2. The Ninth Circuit did not err in declining to recognize a new fed-eral common-law cause of action under LMRA §301(a) for IBT’s al-leged tortious interference with the CBA. Though virtually all other Circuits have rejected such claims, Granite Rock argues that doing so in this case is inconsistent with federal labor law’s goal of promoting industrial peace and economic stability through judicial enforcement of CBAs, and with this Court’s precedents holding that a federal common law of labor contracts is necessary to further this goal, see,
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e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U. S. 448, 451. The company says the remedy it seeks is necessary because other poten-tial avenues for deterrence and redress, such as state-law tort claims, unfair labor practices claims before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and federal common-law breach-of-contract claims, are either unavailable or insufficient. But Granite Rock has not yet exhausted all of these avenues for relief, so this case does not provide an opportunity to judge their efficacy. Accordingly, it would be pre-mature to recognize the cause of action Granite Rock seeks, even as-suming §301(a) authorizes this Court to do so. That is particularly true here because the complained-of course of conduct has already prompted judgments favorable to Granite Rock from the jury below and from the NLRB in separate proceedings concerning the union’s attempts to delay the new CBA’s ratification. Those proceedings, and others to be conducted on remand, buttress the conclusion that Gran-ite Rock’s assumptions about the adequacy of other avenues of relief are questionable, and that the Court of Appeals did not err in declin-ing to recognize the new federal tort Granite Rock requests. Pp. 20– 25.
546 F. 3d 1169, reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
T HOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS, C. J., and S CALIA, K ENNEDY, G INSBURG, B REYER, and A LITO, JJ., joined, and in which S TEVENS and S OTOMAYOR, JJ., joined as to Part III. S O-TOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which S TEVENS, J., joined.
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 08–1214
GRANITE ROCK COMPANY, PETITIONER v.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 24, 2010]
J USTICE T HOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves an employer’s claims against a local union and the union’s international parent for economic damages arising out of a 2004 strike. The claims turn in part on whether a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) containing a no-strike provision was validly formed during the strike period. The employer contends that it was, while the unions contend that it was not. Because the CBA contains an arbitration clause, we first address whether the parties’ dispute over the CBA’s ratification date was a matter for the District Court or an arbitrator to resolve. We conclude that it was a matter for judicial resolution. Next, we address whether the Court of Ap-peals erred in declining the employer’s request to recog-nize a new federal cause of action under §301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. §185(a), for the international union’s alleged tortious interference with the CBA. The Court of Appeals did not err in declining this request.
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I
Petitioner Granite Rock Company is a concrete and building materials company that has operated in Califor-nia since 1900. Granite Rock employs approximately 800 employees under different labor contracts with several unions, including respondent International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 287 (Local). Granite Rock and Local were parties to a 1999 CBA that expired in April 2004. The parties’ attempt to negotiate a new CBA hit an im-passe and, on June 9, 2004, Local members initiated a strike in support of their contract demands.1
The strike continued until July 2, 2004, when the par-ties reached agreement on the terms of a new CBA. The CBA contained a no-strike clause but did not directly address union members’ liability for any strike-related damages Granite Rock may have incurred before the new CBA was negotiated but after the prior CBA had expired. At the end of the negotiating session on the new CBA, Local’s business representative, George Netto, approached Granite Rock about executing a separate “back-to-work” agreement that would, among other things, hold union members harmless for damages incurred during the June 2004 strike. Netto did not make execution of such an agreement a condition of Local’s ratification of the CBA, or of Local’s decision to cease picketing. Thus, Local did not have a back-to-work or hold-harmless agreement in place when it voted to ratify the CBA on July 2, 2004. Respondent International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), which had advised Local throughout the CBA nego-——————
1In deciding the arbitration question in this case we rely upon the terms of the CBA and the facts in the District Court record. In review-ing the judgment affirming dismissal of Granite Rock’s tort claims against respondent International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) for failure to state a claim, we rely on the facts alleged in Granite Rock’s Third Amended Complaint. See, e.g.,H. J. Inc.v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 250 (1989).
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tiations and whose leadership and members supported the June strike, opposed Local’s decision to return to work without a back-to-work agreement shielding both Local and IBT members from liability for strike-related dam-ages. In an effort to secure such an agreement, IBT in-structed Local’s members not to honor their agreement to return to work on July 5, and instructed Local’s leaders to continue the work stoppage until Granite Rock agreed to hold Local and IBT members free from liability for the June strike. Netto demanded such an agreement on July 6, but Granite Rock refused the request and informed Local that the company would view any continued strike activity as a violation of the new CBA’s no-strike clause. IBT and Local responded by announcing a company-wide strike that involved numerous facilities and hundreds of workers, including members of IBT locals besides Local 287.
According to Granite Rock, IBT not only instigated this strike; it supported and directed it. IBT provided pay and benefits to union members who refused to return to work, directed Local’s negotiations with Granite Rock, supported Local financially during the strike period with a $1.2 million loan, and represented to Granite Rock that IBT had unilateral authority to end the work stoppage in exchange for a hold-harmless agreement covering IBT members within and outside Local’s bargaining unit.
On July 9, 2004, Granite Rock sued IBT and Local in the District Court, seeking an injunction against the ongoing strike and strike-related damages. Granite Rock’s complaint, originally and as amended, invoked federal jurisdiction under LMRA §301(a), alleged that the July 6 strike violated Local’s obligations under the CBA’s no-strike provision, and asked the District Court to enjoin the strike because the hold-harmless dispute giving rise to the strike was an arbitrable grievance. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235, 237–238, 253–254 (1970)
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(holding that federal courts may enjoin a strike where a CBA contemplates arbitration of the dispute that occa-sions the strike). The unions conceded that LMRA §301(a) gave the District Court jurisdiction over the suit but op-posed Granite Rock’s complaint, asserting that the CBA was not validly ratified on July 2 (or at any other time relevant to the July 2004 strike) and, thus, its no-strike clause did not provide a basis for Granite Rock’s claims challenging the strike.
The District Court initially denied Granite Rock’s re-quest to enforce the CBA’s no-strike provision because Granite Rock was unable to produce evidence that the CBA was ratified on July 2. App. 203–213. Shortly after the District Court ruled, however, a Local member testi-fied that Netto had put the new CBA to a ratification vote on July 2, and that the voting Local members unani-mously approved the agreement. Based on this statement and supporting testimony from 12 other employees, Gran-ite Rock moved for a new trial on its injunction and dam-ages claims.
On August 22, while that motion was pending, Local conducted a second successful “ratification” vote on the CBA, and on September 13, the day the District Court was scheduled to hear Granite Rock’s motion, the unions called off their strike. Although their return to work mooted Granite Rock’s request for an injunction, the District Court proceeded with the hearing and granted Granite Rock a new trial on its damages claims. The parties pro-ceeded with discovery and Granite Rock amended its complaint, which already alleged federal2 claims for breach of the CBA against both Local and IBT, to add federal inducement of breach and interference with con-——————
2This Court has recognized a federal common-law claim for breach of a CBA under LMRA §301(a). See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U. S. 448, 456 (1957).
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tract (hereinafter tortious interference) claims against IBT.
IBT and Local both moved to dismiss. Among other things, IBT argued that Granite Rock could not plead a federal tort claim under §301(a) because that provision supports a federal cause of action only for breach of con-tract. The District Court agreed and dismissed Granite Rock’s tortious interference claims. The District Court did not, however, grant Local’s separate motion to send the parties’ dispute over the CBA’s ratification date to arbitra-tion.3 The District Court held that whether the CBA was ratified on July 2 or August 22 was an issue for the court to decide, and submitted the question to a jury. The jury reached a unanimous verdict that Local ratified the CBA on July 2, 2004. The District Court entered the verdict and ordered the parties to proceed with arbitration on Granite Rock’s breach-of-contract claims for strike-related damages.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. See 546 F. 3d 1169 (2008). The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of Granite Rock’s tortious interference claims against IBT. See id., at 1170–1175. But it disagreed with the District Court’s determination that the date of the CBA’s ratifica-tion was a matter for judicial resolution. See id., at 1176– 1178. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the parties’ dispute over this issue was governed by the CBA’s arbitra-tion clause because the clause clearly covered the related strike claims, the “national policy favoring arbitration” required that any ambiguity about the scope of the parties’ arbitration clause be resolved in favor of arbitrability, and, ——————
3The CBA’s ratification date is important to Granite Rock’s underly-ing suit for strike damages. If the District Court correctly concluded that the CBA was ratified on July 2, Granite Rock could argue on remand that the July work stoppage violated the CBA’s no-strike clause.
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in any event, Granite Rock had “implicitly” consented to arbitrate the ratification-date dispute “by suing under the contract.” Id., at 1178 (internal quotation marks omitted). We granted certiorari. See 557 U. S. ___ (2009).
II
It is well settled in both commercial and labor cases that whether parties have agreed to “submi[t] a particular dispute to arbitration” is typically an “‘issue for judicial determination.’” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U. S. 79, 83 (2002) (quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649 (1986)); see John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543, 546–547 (1964). It is similarly well settled that where the dispute at issue concerns contract formation, the dispute is generally for courts to decide. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 944 (1995) (“When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . courts generally . . . should apply ordinary . . . principles that govern the formation of contracts”); AT&T Technologies, supra, at 648?649 (explaining the settled rule in labor cases that “‘arbitration is a matter of con-tract’” and “arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration”); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440, 444, n. 1 (2006) (distinguishing treatment of the generally nonarbitral question whether an arbitration agreement was “ever concluded” from the question whether a contract con- taining an arbitration clause was illegal when formed, which question we held to be arbitrable in certain circumstances).
These principles would neatly dispose of this case if the formation dispute here were typical. But it is not. It is based on when (not whether) the CBA that contains the parties’ arbitration clause was ratified and thereby
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formed.4 And at the time the District Court considered Local’s demand to send this issue to an arbitrator, Granite Rock, the party resisting arbitration, conceded both the formation and the validity of the CBA’s arbitration clause. These unusual facts require us to reemphasize the proper framework for deciding when disputes are arbitra-ble under our precedents. Under that framework, a court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. See First Options, supra, at 943; AT&T Technologies, supra, at 648?649. To satisfy itself that such agreement exists, the court must resolve any issue that calls into question the formation or applicability of the specific arbitration clause that a party seeks to have the court enforce. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, ante, at 4?6 (opinion of S CALIA, J.). Where there is no provision validly committing them to an arbitrator, see ante, at 7, these issues typically concern the scope of the arbitration clause and its enforceability. In addition, these issues always include whether the clause was agreed to, and may include when that agreement was formed.
A
The parties agree that it was proper for the District Court to decide whether their ratification dispute was arbitrable.5 They disagree about whether the District Court answered the question correctly. Local contends that the District Court erred in holding that the CBA’s ——————
4Although a union ratification vote is not always required for the provisions in a CBA to be considered validly formed, the parties agree that ratification was such a predicate here. See App. 349–351.
5 Because neither party argues that the arbitrator should decide this question, there is no need to apply the rule requiring “ ‘clear and unmistakable’ ” evidence of an agreement to arbitrate arbitrability. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 944 (1995) (quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649 (1986) (alterations omitted)).
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ratification date was an issue for the court to decide. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the District Court’s refusal to send that dispute to arbitration violated two principles of arbitrability set forth in our precedents. See 546 F. 3d, at 1177?1178. The first principle is that where, as here, parties concede that they have agreed to arbitrate some matters pursuant to an arbitration clause, the “law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration” counsel that “‘any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.’” First Options, supra, at 945 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 626 (1985)); see 546 F. 3d, at 1177?1178 (citing this principle and the “national policy favoring arbitration” in concluding that arbitration clauses “are to be construed very broadly” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). The second principle the Court of Appeals invoked is that this presumption of arbitrability applies even to disputes about the enforce-ability of the entire contract containing the arbitration clause, because at least in cases governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq.,6 courts must treat the arbitration clause as severable from the contract in which it appears, and thus apply the clause to all dis-putes within its scope “‘[u]nless the [validity] challenge is to the arbitration clause itself’” or the party “disputes the ——————
6We, like the Court of Appeals, discuss precedents applying the FAA because they employ the same rules of arbitrability that govern labor cases. See, e.g., AT&T Technologies, supra, at 650. Indeed, the rule that arbitration is strictly a matter of consent—and thus that courts must typically decide any questions concerning the formation or scope of an arbitration agreement before ordering parties to comply with it—is the cornerstone of the framework the Court announced in the Steel-workers Trilogy for deciding arbitrability disputes in LMRA cases. See Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564, 567?568 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 582 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 597 (1960).
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formation of [the] contract,” 546 F. 3d, at 1176 (quoting Buckeye, 546 U. S., at 445?446); 546 F. 3d, at 1177, and n. 4 (explaining that it would treat the parties’ arbitration clause as enforceable with respect to the ratification-date dispute because no party argued that the “clause is invalid in any way”)).
Local contends that our precedents, particularly those applying the “‘federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes,’” permit no other result. Brief for Respondent Local, p. 15 (quoting Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U. S. 368, 377 (1974)); see Brief for Respondent Local, pp. 10–13; 16–25. Local, like the Court of Appeals, over-reads our precedents. The language and holdings on which Local and the Court of Appeals rely cannot be di-vorced from the first principle that underscores all of our arbitration decisions: Arbitration is strictly “a matter of consent,” Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trus-tees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989), and thus “is a way to resolve those disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to sub-mit to arbitration,” First Options, 514 U. S., at 943 (em-phasis added).7 Applying this principle, our precedents hold that courts should order arbitration of a dispute only where the court is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties’ arbitration agreement nor (absent a valid provision specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator) its enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue. Ibid. Where a party contests either or both matters, “the court” must resolve the disagreement. Ibid. Local nonetheless interprets some of our opinions to depart from this framework and to require arbitration of ——————
7See also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 57 (1995); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 219– 220 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506, 511 (1974); AT&T Technologies, supra, at 648; Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 582; United States v. Moorman, 338 U. S. 457, 462 (1950).
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certain disputes, particularly labor disputes, based on policy grounds even where evidence of the parties’ agree-ment to arbitrate the dispute in question is lacking. See Brief for Respondent Local, p. 16 (citing cases emphasizing the policy favoring arbitration generally and the “impres-sive policy considerations favoring arbitration” in LMRA cases (internal quotation marks omitted)). That is not a fair reading of the opinions, all of which compelled arbitra-tion of a dispute only after the Court was persuaded that the parties’ arbitration agreement was validly formed and that it covered the dispute in question and was legally enforceable. See, e.g., First Options, supra, at 944–945. That Buckeye and some of our cases applying a presump-tion of arbitrability to certain disputes do not discuss each of these requirements merely reflects the fact that in those cases some of the requirements were so obviously satisfied that no discussion was needed.
In Buckeye, the formation of the parties’ arbitration agreement was not at issue because the parties agreed that they had “concluded” an agreement to arbitrate and memorialized it as an arbitration clause in their loan contract. 546 U. S., at 444, n. 1. The arbitration clause’s scope was also not at issue, because the provision ex-pressly applied to “‘[a]ny claim, dispute, or controversy . . . arising from or relating to . . . the validity, enforceability, or scope of this Arbitration Provision or the entire Agree-ment.’” Id., at 442. The parties resisting arbitration (customers who agreed to the broad arbitration clause as a condition of using Buckeye’s loan service) claimed only that a usurious interest provision in the loan agreement invalidated the entire contract, including the arbitration clause, and thus precluded the Court from relying on the clause as evidence of the parties’ consent to arbitrate matters within its scope. See id., at 443. In rejecting this argument, we simply applied the requirement in §2 of the FAA that courts treat an arbitration clause as severable
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from the contract in which it appears and enforce it ac-cording to its terms unless the party resisting arbitration specifically challenges the enforceability of the arbitration clause itself, see id., at 443?445 (citing 9 U. S. C. §2; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 4?5 (1984); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395, 402?404 (1967)), or claims that the agreement to arbitrate was “[n]ever concluded,” 546 U. S., at 444, n. 1; see also Rent-A-Center, ante, at 6?7, and n. 2.
Our cases invoking the federal “policy favoring arbitra-tion” of commercial and labor disputes apply the same framework. They recognize that, except where “the par-ties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise,” AT&T Technologies, 475 U. S., at 649, it is “the court’s duty to interpret the agreement and to determine whether the parties intended to arbitrate grievances concerning” a particular matter, id., at 651. They then discharge this duty by: (1) applying the presumption of arbitrability only where a validly formed and enforceable arbitration agree-ment is ambiguous about whether it covers the dispute at hand; and (2) adhering to the presumption and ordering arbitration only where the presumption is not rebutted. See id., at 651–652; Prima Paint Corp., supra, at 396–398; Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U. S. 368, 374–377 (1974); Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 370 U. S. 254, 256–257 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238, 241–242 (1962); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 576 (1960).8
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8That our labor arbitration precedents apply this rule is hardly sur-prising. As noted above, see n. 6, supra, the rule is the foundation for the arbitrability framework this Court announced in the Steelworkers Trilogy. Local’s assertion that Warrior & Gulf suggests otherwise is misplaced. Although Warrior & Gulf contains language that might in isolation be misconstrued as establishing a presumption that labor disputes are arbitrable whenever they are not expressly excluded from an arbitration clause, 363 U. S., at 578–582, the opinion elsewhere
12 GRANITE ROCK CO. v. TEAMSTERS
Opinion of the Court
Local is thus wrong to suggest that the presumption of arbitrability we sometimes apply takes courts outside our settled framework for deciding arbitrability. The pre-sumption simply assists in resolving arbitrability disputes within that framework. Confining the presumption to this role reflects its foundation in “the federal policy favoring arbitration.” As we have explained, this “policy” is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to “overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Volt, 489 U. S., at 478 (inter-nal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, we have never held that this policy overrides the principle that a court may submit to arbitration “only those dis-putes . . . that the parties have agreed to submit.” First Options, 514 U. S., at 943; see also Mastrobuono v. Shear-son Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 57 (1995) (“[T]he FAA’s proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contract parties”); AT&T Tech-nologies, 475 U. S., at 650?651 (applying the same rule to the “presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes”). Nor ——————
emphasizes that even in LMRA cases, “courts” must construe arbitra-tion clauses because “a party cannot be required to submit to arbitra-tion any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” Id., at 582 (applying this rule and finding the dispute at issue arbitrable only after determining that the parties’ arbitration clause could be construed under standard principles of contract interpretation to cover it).
Our use of the same rules in FAA cases is also unsurprising. The rules are suggested by the statute itself. Section 2 of the FAA requires courts to enforce valid and enforceable arbitration agreements accord-ing to their terms. And §4 provides in pertinent part that where a party invokes the jurisdiction of a federal court over a matter that the court could adjudicate but for the presence of an arbitration clause, “[t]he court shall hear the parties” and “direc[t] the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement” except “[i]f the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue,” in which case “the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.” 9 U. S. C. §4.
13
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Opinion of the Court
have we held that courts may use policy considerations as a substitute for party agreement. See, e.g., id., at 648?651; Volt, supra, at 478. We have applied the pre-sumption favoring arbitration, in FAA and in labor cases, only where it reflects, and derives its legitimacy from, a judicial conclusion that arbitration of a particular dispute is what the parties intended because their express agree-ment to arbitrate was validly formed and (absent a provi-sion clearly and validly committing such issues to an arbitrator) is legally enforceable and best construed to encompass the dispute. See First Options, supra, at 944– 945 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U. S., at 626); Howsam, 537 U. S., at 83–84; AT&T Technologies, supra, at 650 (citing Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 582–583); Drake Bakeries, su-pra, at 259–260. This simple framework compels reversal of the Court of Appeals’ judgment because it requires judicial resolution of two questions central to Local’s arbitration demand: when the CBA was formed, and whether its arbitration clause covers the matters Local wishes to arbitrate.
B
We begin by addressing the grounds on which the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision to decide the parties’ ratification-date dispute, which the parties characterize as a formation dispute because a union vote ratifying the CBA’s terms was necessary to form the con-tract. See App. 351.9 For purposes of determining arbi-——————
9The parties’ dispute about the CBA’s ratification date presents a formation question in the sense above, and is therefore not on all fours with, for example, the formation disputes we referenced in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440, 444, n.1 (2006), which concerned whether, not when, an agreement to arbitrate was “con-cluded.” That said, the manner in which the CBA’s ratification date relates to Local’s arbitration demand makes the ratification-date dispute in this case one that requires judicial resolution. See infra, at 14?19.
14 GRANITE ROCK CO. v. TEAMSTERS
Opinion of the Court
trability, when a contract is formed can be as critical as whether it was formed. That is the case where, as here, the date on which an agreement was ratified determines the date the agreement was formed, and thus determines whether the agreement’s provisions were enforceable during the period relevant to the parties’ dispute.10
This formation date question requires judicial resolution here because it relates to Local’s arbitration demand in such a way that the District Court was required to decide the CBA’s ratification date in order to determine whether the parties consented to arbitrate the matters covered by the demand.11 The parties agree that the CBA’s arbitra-tion clause pertains only to disputes that “arise under” the agreement. Accordingly, to hold the parties’ ratification-date dispute arbitrable, the Court of Appeals had to decide whether that dispute could be characterized as “arising under” the CBA. In answering this question in the af-firmative, both Local and the Court of Appeals tied the arbitrability of the ratification-date issue—which Local raised as a defense to Granite Rock’s strike claims—to the arbitrability of the strike claims themselves. See id., at 347. They did so because the CBA’s arbitration clause, which pertains only to disputes “arising under” the CBA ——————
10Our conclusions about the significance of the CBA’s ratification date to the specific arbitrability question before us do not disturb the general rule that parties may agree to arbitrate past disputes or future disputes based on past events.
11In reaching this conclusion we need not, and do not, decide whether every dispute over a CBA’s ratification date would require judicial resolution. We recognize that ratification disputes in labor cases may often qualify as “formation disputes” for contract law purposes because contract law defines formation as acceptance of an offer on specified terms, and in many labor cases ratification of a CBA is necessary to satisfy this formation requirement. See App. 349?351. But it is not the mere labeling of a dispute for contract law purposes that determines whether an issue is arbitrable. The test for arbitrability remains whether the parties consented to arbitrate the dispute in question.
15
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Opinion of the Court
and thus presupposes the CBA’s existence, would seem plainly to cover a dispute that “arises under” a specific substantive provision of the CBA, but does not so obvi-ously cover disputes about the CBA’s own formation. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals relied upon the ratifica-tion dispute’s relationship to Granite Rock’s claim that Local breached the CBA’s no-strike clause (a claim the Court of Appeals viewed as clearly “arising under” the CBA) to conclude that “the arbitration clause is certainly ‘susceptible of an interpretation’ that covers” Local’s for-mation-date defense. 546 F. 3d, at 1177, n. 4.
The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that this the-ory of the ratification dispute’s arbitrability fails if the CBA was not formed at the time the unions engaged in the acts that gave rise to Granite Rock’s strike claims. The unions began their strike on July 6, 2004, and Granite Rock filed its suit on July 9. If, as Local asserts, the CBA containing the parties’ arbitration clause was not ratified, and thus not formed, until August 22, there was no CBA for the July no-strike dispute to “arise under,” and thus no valid basis for the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Gran-ite Rock’s July 9 claims arose under the CBA and were thus arbitrable along with, by extension, Local’s formation date defense to those claims.12 See ibid. For the foregoing reasons, resolution of the parties’ dispute about whether the CBA was ratified in July or August was central to deciding Local’s arbitration demand. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was not neces-sary for the District Court to determine the CBA’s ratifica-tion date in order to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate Granite Rock’s no-strike claim or the ratification-date dispute Local raised as a defense to that claim. ——————
12This analysis pertains only to the Court of Appeals’ decision, which did not engage the 11th-hour retroactivity argument Local raised in its merits brief in this Court, and that we address below.
子部分A—概述 192.1 本部分范围 (a)本部分依据外部大陆架陆地法案(美国联邦法典第43部第1331部分)所定义的术语规定的管道设施和天然气运输的最低安全要求，包括外大陆架范围内的管道设施和天然气的运输。 (b)本部分不适用于: (1)开采碳氢化合物或把开采的碳氢化合物进行初次分离，脱水，或对其进行其它处理的每 座出口法兰上游的海洋管道，下游更远的设施为先。 (2)下列区域以外的天然气的陆上采集。 ①任何城市，城镇或乡村结合部或非结合部界线以内的区域。 ②指定的任何住宅区或商业区，如小区、商业或购物中心、或社区开发地界。 (3)墨西哥湾入海口内的天然气的陆上采集。第192.612 款规定的情况除外。 (4)只把石油天然气或石油天然气/空气混合物输送到下列位置的所有管道系统。 ①少于10个用户，如果系统任何部分均不位于公共场所内；或 ②仅有一个用户，如果系统完全位于该用户的土地上(无论该系统的某个部分是否位于公 共场所内)。 (5)外大陆架上游的某个点，天然气开采商的运营责任正是从此点开始移交给管道运输商的。192.3 定义 以下为在本部分所用相关词的定义。 “局长”指研究和特殊计划局局长，或运输部部长委派其为代表，授权其处理有关事宜的任何人。 “配气管道”指管道，而不是集气管道或输送管道。 “暴露的管道”指管顶凸出于水深不到15 ft(4.6 m)的海床之上（按平均落潮水位测定值）。 “气体”指天然气、易燃气体、或有毒或腐蚀性气体。 “集气管道”指从当前的开采设施，向输送管道或干线运输天然气的管道。 “墨西哥湾及其入海口”指从墨西哥湾海岸和其朝向大海的入海口的平均高水位标志的水域(不包括河流、潮汐滩涂、湖泊和运河)，包括水深达15 ft(4.6 m)的领海和外大陆架（按平均落潮水位测定值）。 “对航行造成危胁”，按本部分之目的，指埋设在水深不到15 ft(4.6 m)的海床之下的、管顶覆盖层小于12 inch(305 mm)的管道（按平均落潮水位测定值）。 “高压配气系统”指在某个配气系统中，干线管道内的气体压力高于向用户送气的压力。 “管段”指在毗连压缩机站之间、在压缩机站和储气设施之间、在压缩机站和截断阀之间、或在毗连截断阀之间连续运行的输送管道。 “列出的规范”指在本部分附录B第一部分中列出的规范。 “低压配气系统”指在某个配气系统中，干线管道内的气体压力与向用户送气的压力实际相等。 “干线”指作为一条普通供气源，为一条以上的送气管道供应天然气的配气管道。 “最大实际运行压力”指正常运行超过1年期间所生成的最高压力。 “最大允许工作压力(MAOP)”指管道或管段可以在本部分规定的压力下来工作的最高压力值。 “自治区”指某个州的某座城市、县城、或任何其他政治区划。 “海上”指沿美国海岸部分一般落潮水位线以外，该部分直接与公海相接壤，以及内陆水域朝海界限标记线以外。 “运营商”指某个专门从事天然气运输的人。 “外大陆架”指下沉陆地法案(美国联邦法典第43部第1301部分)第II部分所定义的、位于朝海方向的所有下沉陆地，和位于适航水域之下、陆地区域以外的所有下沉陆地。这些陆地的下层土壤及海床属美国所有，并受美国所管辖和控制。 229
《美国统一继承法典》概述 周强刘晓星 美国是一个联邦制的国家，法律制度实行的是双轨制，即联邦颁布的法律和各州颁布的法律。由于诸多原因，各州所颁布的法律极不统一，因而常常引起相互间的法律冲突。为了克服这种现象，自本世纪初以来，美国一些非官方机构在致力于统一美国各州法律的问题上作出了很大的努力。迄今为止，已制定了大量的统一法律规范供名洲采角或立法参考，其中有些法律规范已为各州采用或修改采用，‘发生法律效力。一九六八年八月美国州法律全国统一委员会和美国律师协会批准的《美国统一继承法典》(以下简称法典)就是在统一美国各州继承法律制度方面起着重要作用的一部示范性的法典。该法典的特点是:内容详尽，立法精巧，实体法与程序法紧密结合，法典既保留了各州原来实行的普通法中的一些继承制度，又兼收了罗马法的一些原则。所以，自该法典获批准以来，巳有十几个州采用或在不同程度上修改后采用。 法典共有三百零四条，主要内容如下: 一、无遗嘱继承。 无遗嘱继承，是指被继承人死亡时未立遗嘱，其遗产依无遗嘱继承的法律规定转移给无遗嘱继承人。 l、无遗嘱继承人的范围和顺序:法典规定，配偶、子女、父母、兄弟姐妹、祖父母、外祖父母均为无遗嘱法定继承人..对配偶、子女、父母的定义，法典又作了特殊的规定。对配偶的规定中指出，凡与被继承人离婚或与被继承人的婚姻宣告无效的人，得到或同意在本州尚未被承认有效的与被继承人离婚或宣告他们婚姻无效的最终判决的人，同意法院依被继承人提议作出的离婚或宣告他们婚姻无效的判决的人，均不属于被继承人的配偶。子女是指有权根据法律规定通过无遗嘱继承从与其有血缘关系的父母处取得遗产的一切子女。但继子女和非婚生子女不包括在内。父母是指在子女无遗嘱死亡时，有权根据无遗嘱继承从与其有血缘关系的已亡子女处取得财产的人。但继父母不包括在内。 由此可见，法典真接规定的无遗嘱继承人的范围，要比原来各州所规定的范围小得多。由此法典规定，无遗嘱继承人的继承顺序是:(1)子女、(2)父毋、(3)兄弟姐妹、(4)祖父母、外祖父母。被继承人的配偶未列入任何具体的顺序，由法律另行单独规定继承权。 2、遗产继承份额.法典采用法定份额和同一继承人均分遗产的混合制度。所谓法定应继份额，是指法律对某些继承人的应继遗产份额直接作出规定。相同顺序继承人均分制，是指享有法定份额以外的其他同一顺序继承人依照法律的规定平等地分配遗产。 享有法定份额的人，包括配偶和未成年的子女以及未独立生活的成年子女。配偶的法定遗产份额，是在被继承人没有第一、第二顺序无遗嘱继承人的情况下，继承全部遗产，如在被继承人留有父母的情况下，先继承五万美元的遗产后，再继承剩余遗产的二分之一，如在被继承人留有子女的情况下，先继承五万美元的遗产后，再继承剩余遗产的二分之一卜在被继承人留有亲生子女，但该子女并非与生存配偶所生的子女时，则生存配偶只能继承遗产 的二分之一。此外，法典还废除了某些州实行的寡妇产和鳏夫产制度，而赋予生存配偶选择权和取得宅园特留份、
美国法典 第42卷公众健康与福利 第55章国家环境政策法 （1969年制定） 第4321条国会的目的宣言 本法的目的在于：宣示国家政策，促进人类与环境之间的充分和谐；努力提倡防止或者减少对环境与自然生命物的伤害，增进人类的健康与福利；充分了解生态系统以及自然资源对国家的重要性；设立环境质量委员会。 第4322条至第4330条（原文略） 第一节政策与目标 第4331条国会国家环境政策宣言 鉴于人类活动对自然环境一切构成部分的内在联系具有深远影响，尤其在人口增长、高度集中的都市化、工业发展、资源开发以及技术日益进步所带来的深远影响，并鉴于恢复和保持环境质量对于全人类的福利与发展所具有的重要性，国会特宣布：联邦政府将与各州、地方政府以及有关公共和私人团体合作采取一切切实可行的手段和措施，包括财政和技术上的援助，发展和增进一般福利，创造和保持人类与自然得以共处与和谐中生存的各种条件，满足当代国民及其子孙后代对于社会、经济以及其他方面的要求。 为执行本法规定的政策，联邦政府有责任采取一切切实可行、并与国家政策的其他基本考虑相一致的措施，改进并协调联邦的计划、职能、方案和资源，以达到如下目的，即国家应当：1．履行每一代人都作为子孙后代的环境保管人的责任； 2．保证为全体国民创造安全、健康、富有生命力并符合美学和文化上的优美的环境； 3. 最大限度地合理利用环境，不得使其恶化或者对健康和安全造成危害，或者引起其他不良的和不应有的后果； 4 保护国家历史、文化和自然等方面的重要遗产，并尽可能保持一种能为每个人提供丰富与多样选择的环境； 5谋求人口与资源的利用达到平衡，促使国民享受高度的生活水平和广泛舒适的生活； 6．提高可更新资源的质量，使易枯竭资源达到最高程度的再循环。国会认为，每个人都可以享受健康的环境，同时每个人也有责任参与对环境改善与保护。 第4332条机构合作报告；提供资讯；建议；国际与国内的合作国会授权并命令国家机构，应当尽一切可能实现： 1．国家的各项政策、法律以及公法解释与执行均应当与本法的规定相一致。 2．所有联邦政府的机关均应当： (1)在进行可能对人类环境产生影响的规划和决定时，应当采用足以确保综合利用自然科学、社会科学以及环境设计工艺的系统性和多学科的方法。 （2）与依本法第二节规定而设立的环境质量委员会进行磋商，确定并开发各种方法与程序，确保在做出决定时使得当前尚不符合要求的环境舒适和环境价值。能与经济和技术问题一并得到适当的考虑。 （3）对人类环境质量具有重大影响的各项提案或法律草案、建议报告以及其他重大联邦行为，均应当由负责经办的官员提供一份包括下列事项的详细说明： ①拟议行为对环境的影响； ②提案行为付诸实施对环境所产生的不可避免的不良影响； ③提案行为的各种替代方案； ④对人类环境的区域性短期使用与维持和加强长期生命力之间的关系； ⑤提案行为付诸实施时可能产生的无法恢复和无法补救的资源耗损。在制作详细说明之前，联邦
一个刚退伍的老兵,一天夜里起床上厕所时,发现老伴没有睡在身边,枕头掉在木头地板上,然后很疑惑的他走进厕所发现了马桶上有一件很小的绿色衣服,当场就被吓死了,请问為什麼? 关键字提示：老兵枕头绿色衣服（不是其他顏色） 2 七点十二分 一名男子很惧怕坐飞机,但是由於工作的关係不得不乘坐飞机在各国间出差往来。他每次都对於时差现象特别不适应，有一次他来到了一个跨洲的国家后，下飞机后看了一下手錶，显示的是早上七点十二分，他随后就哭著自杀了，请问為什麼? 关键字提示：跨洲的国家七点十二分 3 钥匙 一名保险推销员下班后去超市买过耶诞节送给女友的礼品，他最终买的是一个刻有月亮图案的纯银掛件。出超市后，他看见一个小姑娘在路边哭泣，就过去看怎麼回事，突然发现那个小姑娘胸前有一串钥匙。第二天，警方发现小姑娘全身赤裸地死在街边，试分析原因。 关键字提示：保险推销员全身赤裸 4 半张相片 女孩和男孩恋爱很久，当初是男孩先追求的女孩。女孩过生日了，男孩送给她一个音乐盒，虽然是旧的，但女孩十分高兴。不久后有一天，女孩不小心把音乐盒摔坏了，发现里面夹这一张只剩半截的旧相片，上面很模糊地像是一条狗的影像，女孩马上吓死了，请问為什麼? 关键字提示：旧的音乐盒半张相片一条狗的影
有一个孩子，他的父亲是名英国医生，他的母亲是一名日本的英语教师，他从小就因為自己是混血儿而倍感自豪。有一天他翻开母亲上课準备的讲义，发现里面有一张很久前的便条纸，上面画了一面英国国旗，没涂顏色，他立刻回家刺杀了父亲，请问為什麼? 关键字提示：医生英语教师国旗没涂顏色 6 MSN头象 一名有前科的男子刚从警局回家，他由於某件杀人事件而三不五时地被召唤去警局盘问，但由於证据不足被释放了。回家后他和往常一样打开了MSN聊天，忽然发现一名网友的头像是一件骯脏的黑色西装，他马上衝出去，到街上买了一件相同规格，但是顏色為白色的西装。 试分析原因。 关键字提示：骯脏的黑色西装白色的西装 7 可乐的味道 一个在运动中骨折的患者（女性）康復出院了，家里庆祝并大摆宴席。喝饮料的时候，患者的哥哥说今天的可乐怎麼味道有点怪，然后患者的父亲和母亲也喝了纷纷表示可乐味道的确不对。但患者喝后坚称味道正常。患者死於当天晚上洗澡的澡盆里。為什麼？ 关键字提示：女性晚上澡盆 8.牛吃草 有一个年轻的男人，他的房子和邻居夫妇的房子中间隔著一片草坪。有一天深夜，男人被隔壁的吵架声吵醒，之后他又听到了摔东西声、砍刀子声和，过了一会，他又听到了有人撞他家门的声音，但他都没有理会，又睡了过去。第二天，他发现隔壁的男主人惨死在他家门口。推理其过程。 9.云霄飞车
目录 第一章概论 第一节证据和证据法的定义 一、证据 二、证据法 第二节美国证据法的法典化过程 一、早期法典 二、《示范证据法典》 三、《统一证据法规则》 四、《联邦证据规则》 第三节美国证据法的法律渊源 一、成文法 二、普通法 第四节证据法的目的 一、查明事实真相 二、促进诉讼效率 三、促进公共政策 四、保证诉讼程序公正 第五节《联邦证据规则》的适用范围 一、《适用联邦证据规则》的法庭 二、《适用联邦证据规则》的程序 三、不《适用联邦证据规则》的程序 第二章举证责任和假定 第一节举证责任 一、出示证据的责任 二、说服的责任 第二节假定 一、假定和推理 二、规定假定的理由 三、假定的法律后果 四、刑事案件中的假定 第三节对前提事实的确定 一、由陪审团决定的前提事实 二、由法官决定的前提事实 第三章司法确认 第一节概述 一、司法确认的定义 二、对司法事实进行司法确认 三、对法律本身进行司法确认 四、立法事实 五、背景事实 第二节对事实的司法确认
一、可以对哪些事实进行司法确认 二、与司法确认有关的程序问题 第四章证据的相关性 第一节证据可以被采纳的最低要求 一、重要性 二、相关性 三、有证明能力（不违反证据排除规则） 四、相关性证据 五、证据的有限采纳 第二节证据的种类和形式 一、证据种类：直接证据和间接证据 二、证据形式：证人证言、书证、物证以及演示证据 第三节相关性证据 一、《联邦证据规则》关于证据相关性的定义 二、为什么要确定证据的相关性 三、如何确定证据的相关性 第四节相关性证据的排除 一、相关性证据可以依据法律规定被排除 二、法官行使自由裁量权原因而被排除的相关性证据 三、因为公共政策原因而被排除的相关性证据 第五章性格作为证据 第一节概述 一、什么是性格证据 二、性格作为证据的一般前提 第二节民事案件中的性格证据 一、一般规则 二、例外情况 第三节刑事案件中的性格证据 一、一般规则 二、例外情况 第四节反强奸条例 一、一般规定 二、例外情况 第五节特定的不当行为 一、一般规定 二、例外情况 三、性骚扰案件及骚扰儿童案件 第六节习惯作为证据 第六章言词证据 第一节证人的作证能力 一、作为证人的基本条件
美国FBI犯罪心理测试题 题目是没有所谓正确答案的,题目不是判断一个人的IQ,而是判断一个人是不是心理变态,不同的人会有不同的答案.如果你的心理正常~你几乎想不到所谓的"标准答案".只要你认为正确就是答案,没有错对,如果你真的答中了那个"标准答案"那你90%就是心理变态.如果你看到题目不经思考马上可以想到变态答案,你或多或少有不同程度的变态,这些绝对不是乱编,都是FBI的心理专家写的,可以很正确测定一个人心理状态的题目。 这些测试题目你不要专门去想变态的答案,你看到题目后,不经过考虑首先得出想法是怎么样,才可以测试你自己的心理状况.不要看了标题就转牛尖的去想专门那些变态的答案,这些绝对不是IQ测试,你根本不用为了要找一个自己认为够cool的答案伤脑筋.其实那些很多题目答案对正常人来说根本就没有得解,想不到有答案就是最好的答案,如果你真想到了变态的答案不是表示你聪明,是表示你对一件事情想法与正常人有很多的出入,极很有可能心理出问题。 第一题：企鹅肉 一个男科学家回忆说：他和他的朋友去南极考察，但是他中途中了雪盲，什么都看不到。所以他们在南极游荡，最后只能生吃企鹅来维持生命。但是他朋友最后还是没有挺住，最后死了。他一个人继续走了一天，最后被救了回去。第二天他特意去企鹅店吃企鹅，但是回来后竟然自杀了。为什么？ 心理严重变态答：男孩以前曾和女友一起去北极考察，因为没东西吃，女孩把自己的肉一片片割给男孩吃，骗他说是企鹅肉，结果男孩活下来了，女孩却饿死了。多年后男孩吃到了真正的企鹅肉，终于明白当时女孩的苦心，伤心之下，自杀徇情。 第二题：跳火车 一个人坐火车去临镇看病，看完之后病全好了。回来的路上火车经过一个隧道，这个人就跳车自杀了。
美国法律体系简介 WEIHUA system office room 【WEIHUA 16H-WEIHUA WEIHUA8Q8-
美国法律体系的早期背景 1、假定你想要起草一个关于美国法律的体系图和执行它们的程序。要想找到美国法律体系的根源，就应该从远古时期的历史中开始探究。也许你可以追溯到的最早根源是在公元前1900年。大概在那个时期制定了汉漠拉比法典，这项法典是为生活在底格里斯河和幼发拉底河流域，即人类文明的发源地的苏美尔人制定的。那项法典包含了早期意义上的法律体系,它规定了各种过错行为和每种过错行为所应受到的惩罚。这样的法律体系其实就是所谓的“刑法”。另一项着名的法典是十诫，是在公元前1200年由摩斯人为犹太人制定的。这些戒律被编纂进了西方社会的上层建筑中。我们发现这些戒律中有很多被写入了现行法，比如针对杀人、通奸、伪证等行为的犯罪。 2、你可以在哲学迅猛发展的古希腊时期找到另外一个重要的根源，那便是法治思想，而非人治思想，这在当今美国仍广为宣传。希腊人那时已经深刻理解了物权法，合同法和商法，并且在陪审员出现之前他们就已经开始尝试法律事务。 3、古希腊文化的发展为罗马复兴奠定基础，这些基础而简单的法律根源基本上融入到了更为全面的法律实体中。公元前450年的罗马时期制定的十二铜表法，成为罗马时期的道德原则的渊源并且在实践生活中应用。一千年之后，在公元后560年东罗马帝国皇帝的统治时期，所有的法律被汇编为法典，或者是编纂到国法大全中。那个时期的法典是当时最复杂的一部法律合集，并且对罗马帝国时期法律的发展有着深远的影响。随着罗马帝国的分裂衰败，大多数罗马法变成了罗马天主教的教会法。这些法律分支在1804年的拿破仑统治时期被
龙源期刊网 https://www.doczj.com/doc/4c1287891.html, 探秘美国FBI国家学院：从普通人到特工只需5个月 作者： 来源：《科普童话·神秘大侦探》2016年第11期 FBI！你被捕了！你有权保持沉默，但你所说的一切将作为呈堂证供……听说过大名鼎鼎的美国联邦调查局（FBI）吧，但你听过它的特工学院吗？来比比有没有电影《王牌特工》中的酷炫吧。 FBI学院坐落在弗吉尼亚州的海军陆战队基地，占地547英亩，拥有众多优秀的特工教师，致力成为世界一流的特工学院。我们的目标是，培养世界一流的王牌特工！你想成为一名FBI探员吗？快来FBI国家学院吧！ 从哈德逊河上远远望去，国家学院方向是一片数百英亩的茂密森林，连学院的大门都看不见。FBI网站负责人毫不讳言，将国家学院掩藏在无边的绿色之中，不是为了营造诗情画意的氛围，而是出于安全和保密的需要。不要说在地面上，即使乘坐飞机或热气球从空中俯瞰，也难以窥得国家学院的庐山真面目。国家学院的主要建筑包括一座教学楼、一个礼堂、一个法医研究兼训练中心、一家机动车修配厂和一座模拟城市。在模拟城市中，有八个室外靶场、四个飞碟靶场、一个室内靶场和一个两百米步枪冲锋枪专用靶场，以及联邦调查局和毒品管制局学院模拟实战场地。 不少学员此前并没有射击经验。来我们这里参加培训的人员五花八门。有的来自伊拉克、阿富汗战场，有的过去当过警察，还有的过去是农民、动物学家或者飞行员。有些人以前从来没有使用过武器。 在为期20个星期的课程中，准特工们除了要学习射击、格斗技能，掌握情报收集与分析、法律、战略战术运用等知识技巧外，还要参加模拟实战。学院内有座模拟城市叫“霍根巷”，学员们在这里要进行蹲守、追踪、抓捕、防爆等多种演习。而其中的“霍根银行”恐怕是美国遭劫匪袭击最频繁的银行，平均每天被袭3 次。一般来说，FBI特工要会操作防弹装甲车、拆弹机器人等专用设备。此外，针对电脑分析、技术支持、案件处理等部门的特工，还有专门的网络知识、案例研究、机械维修等课程。
隐私权法(美国) 1974年12月31日，美国参众两院通过了《隐私权法》，1979年，美国第96届国会修订《联邦行政程序法》时将其编入《美国法典》第五编“政府组织与雇员”，形成第552a节。该法又称《私生活秘密法》，是美国行政法中保护公民隐私权和了解权的一项重要法律。就政府机构对个人信息的采集、使用、公开和保密问题作出了详细规定，以此规范联邦政府处理个人信息的行为，平衡公共利益与个人隐私权之间的矛盾。 （一）立法原则 《隐私权法》立法的基本原则是： （1）行政机关不应该保有秘密的个人信息记录； （2）个人有权知道自己被行政机关记录的个人信息及其使用情况； （3）为某一目的而采集的公民个人信息，未经本人许可，不得用于其他目的； （4）个人有权查询和请求修改关于自己的个人信息记录； （5）任何采集、保有、使用或传播个人信息的机构，必须保证该信息可靠地用于既定目的，合理地预防该信息的滥用。 （二）适用范围 《隐私权法》对该法出现的“机关”、“人”和“记录”等概念的适用范围做出限定。 1．机关（agency） 该法中的“机关”，包括联邦政府的行政各部、军事部门、政府公司、政府控制的公司，以及行政部门的其他机构，包括总统执行机构在内。该法也适用于不受总统控制的独立行政机关，但国会、隶属于国会的机关和法院、州和地方政府的行政机关不适用该法。 2．人（individual） 该法中的“人”，是指“美国公民或在美国依法享有永久居留权的外国人”。 3．记录（record） 该法中的“记录”，是指包含在某一记录系统中的个人记录。记录系统是指“在行政机关控制之下的任何记录的集合体，其中信息的检索是以个人的姓名或某些可识别的数字、符号或其他个人标识为依据”。个人记录是指“行政机关根据公民的姓名或其他标识而记载的一项或一组信息”。其中，“其他标识”包括别名、相片、指纹、音纹、社会保障号码、护照号码、汽车执照号码，以及其他一切能够用于识别某一特定个人的标识。个人记录涉及教育、经济活动、医疗史、工作履历以及其他一切关于个人情况的记载。 （三）记录公开的限制和登记 1．禁止公开的原则 行政机关在尚未取得公民的书面许可以前，不得公开关于此人的记录。 2．例外 《隐私权法》规定了行政机关可以公开个人记录，无需本人同意的12种例外情况： （1）为执行公务在机关内部使用个人记录； （2）根据《信息自由法》公开的个人记录； （3）记录的使用目的与其制作目的相容、没有冲突，即所谓“常规使用”； （4）向人口普查局提供个人记录； （5）以不能识别出特定个人的形式，向其他机关提供作为统计研究之用的个人记录； （6）向国家档案局提供具有历史价值或其他特别意义值得长期保存的个人记录； （7）为了执法目的向其他机关提供个人记录； （8）在紧急情况下，为了某人的健康或安全而使用个人记录；
七个美国FBI的推理测试题 分享 作者：〤祐笾╭ァ戀已被分享425076次评论(0)复制链接分享转载举报一绿衣服 一个刚退伍的老兵,一天夜裏起床上厕所时,发现老伴没有睡在身边,枕头掉在木头地板上,然后很疑惑的他走进厕所发现了马桶上 有一件很小的绿色衣服,当场就被吓死了,请问为什麽? 关键词提示：老兵枕头绿色衣服（不是其他颜色） 二七点十二分 一名男子很惧怕坐飞机,但是由于工作的关系不得不乘坐飞机在各国间出差往来。他每次都对于时差现象特别不适应，有一次他来到了 一个跨洲的国家后，下飞机后看了一下手表，显示的是早上七点十二分，他随后就哭著自杀了，请问为什麽? 关键词提示：跨洲的国家七点十二分 三钥匙 一名保险推销员下班后去超市买过圣诞节送给女友的礼品，他最终买的是一个刻有月亮图案的纯银挂件。出超市后，他看见一个小姑娘 在路边哭泣，就过去看怎麽回事，突然发现那个小姑娘胸前有一串钥匙。第二天，警方发现小姑娘全身赤裸地死在街边，试分析原因。 关键词提示：保险推销员全身赤裸 四半张相片 女孩和男孩恋爱很久，当初是男孩先追求的女孩。女孩过生日了，男孩送给她一个八音盒，虽然是旧的，但女孩十分高兴。不久后 有一天，女孩不小心把八音盒摔坏了，发现裏面夹这一张只剩半截的旧相片，上面很模糊地象是一条狗的影像，女孩马上吓死了， 请问为什麽? 关键词提示：旧的八音盒半张相片一条狗的影像 五混血儿 有一个孩子，他的父亲是名英国医生，他的母亲是一名日本的英语教师，他从小就因为自己是混血儿而倍感自豪。有一天他翻开母亲 上课准备的讲义，发现裏面有一张很久前的便条纸，上面画了一面英国，他立刻回家刺杀了父亲，请问为什麽? 关键词提示：医生英语教师国旗没涂颜色 六 MSN头象 一名有前科的男子刚从警局回家，他由于某件杀人事件而三不五时地被召唤去警局盘问，但由于证据不足被释放了。回家后他和 往常一样打开了MSN聊天，忽然发现一名网友的头象是一件肮脏的黑色西装，他马上冲出去，到街上买了一件相同规格，但是颜色为白色的西装。 试分析原因。 关键词提示：肮脏的黑色西装白色的西装 七可乐的味道 一个在运动中骨折的患者（女性）康复出院了，家裏庆祝并大摆宴席。喝饮料的时候，患者的哥哥说今天的可乐怎麽味道有点怪，然后患者的父亲
美国FBI面试题 1)企鹅肉 一个女孩有一天给一个男孩做了一道菜,男孩吃完了他,但是觉得味道怪怪的,于是他问那女孩,这是什么肉啊,女孩说,这是企鹅肉,男孩沉思了一会儿......痛哭了起来，自杀了，为什么, 2)跳火车 一个人坐火车去邻镇看病，看完之后病全好了。回来的路上火车经过一个隧道，这个人就跳车自杀了。为什么, 3)水草 有个二子跟他女友去河边散步，突然他的女友掉进河里了，那个二子就急忙跳到水里去找，可没找到他的女友，他伤心的离开了这里，过了几年后，他故地重游，这时看到有个老不死的在钓鱼，可那老王八羔子钓上来的鱼身上没有水草，他就问那老秃驴为什么鱼身上没有沾到一点水草，那老王八羔子说:你丫的脑抽啊，这河从没有长过水草。说到这时那二子突然跳到水里，自杀了。 4)葬礼的故事有母女三人，母亲死了，姐妹俩去参加葬礼，妹妹在葬礼上遇见了一个很型的男子，并对他一见倾心。但是葬礼后那个男子就不见了，妹妹怎么找也找不到他。后来过了一个月，妹妹把姐姐杀了，问为什么, 5)半根火柴 有一个人在沙漠中，头朝下死了，身边散落着几个行李箱子，而这个人手里紧紧地抓着半个火柴，推理这个人是怎么死的, 6)满地木屑 马戏团里有两个侏儒,瞎子侏儒比另一个侏儒矮,马戏团只需要一个侏儒,马戏团里的侏儒当然是越矮越好了.两个侏儒决定比谁的个子矮,个子高的就去自杀.可
是,在约定比个子的前一天,瞎子侏儒也就是那个矮的侏儒已经在家里自杀死了.在他的家里只发现木头做的家具和满地的木屑.问他为什么自杀, 7)夜半敲门一个人住在山顶的小屋里，半夜听见有敲门的，他打开门却没有人，于是去睡了，等了一会又有敲门声，去开门，还是没人，如是者几次。第二天，有人在山脚下发现死尸一具，pol.ice来把山顶的那人带走了。为什么,, 1)企鹅肉 一个女孩有一天给一个男孩做了一道菜,男孩吃完了他,但是觉得味道怪怪的,于是他问那女孩,这是什么肉啊,女孩说,这是企鹅肉,男孩沉思了一会儿......痛哭了起来，自杀了，为什么, (男孩以前曾和女友一起去北极考察,因为没东西吃,女孩把自己的肉一片片割给男孩吃,他说是企鹅肉,结果男孩活下来了,女孩就饿死了。多年后男孩吃到了真正的企鹅肉,终于明白当时女孩的苦心,伤心之下... ) 2)跳火车 一个人坐火车去邻镇看病，看完之后病全好了。回来的路上火车经过一个隧道，这个人就跳车自杀了。为什么。(那个人得的是眼病，到隧道的时候很黑，他以为自己眼睛又坏了，承受不了打击，自杀了) 3)水草 有个二子跟他女友去河边散步，突然他的女友掉进河里了，那个二子就急忙跳到水里去找，可没找到他的女友，他伤心的离开了这里，过了几年后，他故地重游，这时看到有个老不死的在钓鱼，可那老王八羔子钓上来的鱼身上没有水草，他就问那老秃驴为什么鱼身上没有沾到一点水草，那老王八羔子说:你丫的脑抽啊，这河从没有长过水草。说到这时那二子突然跳到水里，自杀了。 (女朋友死的时候他下河，结果几年后才知道河里没什么水草，当时他摸到了女朋友的头发以为是水草，后悔呀。。所以自杀了。)
H.R.4040 美利坚合众国第一百一十届国会 第二次会议 二零零八年一月三日（星期四）于华盛顿市开始举行 有关儿童消费品安全标准和其它安全要求的设立以及消费品安全委员会的重新授权和现代化的法案 本法案由美利坚合众国参议院和众议院于召集的国会会议上通过。 第1条简称；目录 (a) 简称——该法案可称为《2008年消费者产品安全改善法案》（Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008） (b) 目录——本法案目录如下： 第1条简称；目录 第2条参考 第3条发布实施条例的权利 第一编——儿童产品安全 第101条. 含铅儿童产品；含铅涂料标准 第102条. 某些儿童产品的强制性第三方测试 第103条. 儿童产品的跟踪标签 第104条. 耐用婴幼儿产品标准和消费者登记 第105节. 玩具与游戏器具的广告标签要求 第106节. 强制性玩具安全标准 第107节. 对少数民族儿童的与消费品相关的可预防性伤亡研究 第108节. 禁止销售含特定邻苯二甲酸盐的产品 第二编消费品安全委员会改革 第一章——经营管理改善 第201节. 委员会的授权 第202节. 委员会全员要求；临时法定人数；员工 第203节. 部分递送给国会的文件 第204节. 加速制定法律 第205节. 监察长的审查与报告 第206节. 禁止行业赞助的差旅 第207节. 与联邦政府、州政府、地方政府和外国政府机构信息共享 第208节. 交换雇员培训 第209节. 年度报告要求 第二章——加强的执行权力 第211节. 公开信息披露 第212节. 建立一个公众消费品安全数据库 第213节. 依据其他由消费品安全委员会执行的法令制定的储存强制令 第214节. 加强的召回权利以及改正措施计划 第215节. 对于由防火墙隔开的符合性评估机构的检查；供应链的识别 第216节. 禁止行为 第217节. 处罚
美国FBI为何强大？ FBI（美国联邦调查局）是世界上最大的执法机构，美国三大调查机构（即联邦调查局、中央情报局、国家安全局）之一。据说，在他们手上，永远都不会有解决不掉的案子。 但为何他们如此强大？ 首先，他们与其他调查机构各司其职。由中央情报局提供必要的国外情报，以追查国外逃犯；又由国家安全局提供危险嫌疑人的作案证据，以获得司法行政机构的允许；最后由训练有素的联邦调查局特工追捕罪犯嫌疑人，如此相辅相成，罪犯自然就无处可逃了。 其次，联邦调查局特工都必须接受最严格的训练。联邦调查局的训练方式和装备一直都是美国国家级机密，我只知道他们统一的训练地点和代号全都是“农场”，这些特工都是从哪儿走出来的。只要你走入那儿的门，那将注定你会从一个普通人成为了个身手矫健的特工。 第三，美国联邦调查局拥有强大的公民支持和大量的线人。美国民众相信FBI的办案效率，因此都愿意全力协助特工去追捕罪犯。大量的线人使FBI的眼睛遍布整个美国的每一个角落，嫌犯只要还在人世，就一定会落入法网。 最后，美国联邦调查局有强大的技术支持和内部管理机制，从胡佛之后，FBI就在也没有再出现贪污腐败的事，因
为他们有一整套的明文法律规定。而大量科学家、心理学家等提供的技术支持也使FBI变量带回的全能高效。 当然，FBI也有对付不了的敌人；黑手党五大家庭的活动依旧猖獗，而库珀等超级罪犯也都以他们因自然原因死去而不了了之。 但无论如何，FBI都是世界上最强大的执法机构，只要有他们，美国人民就可以“夜不闭户”，这样，也为美国的国际霸主地位打也了牢固的根基。
苍鹰落败 本周我看了一个记录片——《天启〃第二次世界大战》从中，我不仅看到了一个疯子对世界进行的惨无人道的屠戮，还看见了难能可贵的人性闪光。 战争，多么让人哭笑不得的字眼。笑不得是因为战争使大量平民死亡，使人民生于水深水热之中；哭不得是因为战争推动了军工业发展，在一定程度上加速了人类科技的发展。 但我想，我们不能只记住战争带给人民的苦难，还有“乱世出英雄”的豪壮和“患难一条心”的温情。 记录片中，邪恶轴心为了完成他们统治世界的目标，开始入侵同盟国，裕仁、希特勒和墨索里尼这三个疯子的军队真实所向披靡，攻势摧枯拉朽般不可抵挡，鲜血染红了许多土地。苍鹰；即德意志帝国恶魔般的行径使战争的阴云笼罩了大地的每一个角落。 对敌人的愤怒使同盟军不畏惧死亡，因为德国佬们夺走了他们的生活和他们亲人朋友的生命，血债必以血偿！世界上各个国家的人们的心第一次如此近地连在了一起。不管是哪个国家的人种族和籍贯已不再重要，重要的是让恶魔们付出代价！ 各国国民和军队上下一心，全民皆兵。在柏林陷落的那
21 CFR结构内容 在美国，参议员或众议员每年都会提出很多议案（bill）。议案交由委员会审议修订，然后在国会议院投票，一院投票通过后，送交另一院，两院通过后交总统签署；若总统不否决，或虽否决但经两院2/3议员重新通过，即正式成为法律（law）。法律规定了基本的准则，并由联邦政府执行机构根据具体的法规（Regulation）来执行。《美国联邦法规》（Code of FederalRegulations, CFR）是将发表在“联邦公报（Federal Register, FR）”的一般性和永久性法规集合成册的法规典籍。CFR的法规涵盖各方面主题，其中第21篇“食品与药品”就是美国食品药品监督管理局（Food and DrugAdministration, FDA）管理食品和药品的主要法规依据。所谓知己知彼，百战不殆。做好国际药品注册，需要从其法规源头入手。本文带大家了解并熟悉CFR，尤其是第21篇“食品与药品”的结构以及内容。 1. CFR的结构与分类 CFR共50篇（title），代表联邦法规涉及的领域和调整对象，有些篇有分篇（subtitle）；按前后顺序排列分别是：总则、保留、总统、会计、行政人事、保留、农业、外国人与公民、动物与动物产品、能源、联邦选举、银行金融、商业信用与资助、航空与航天、商业与外贸、商业实践、商品与证券交易、电力，水力资源保护、关税、雇员利益、食品与药品、对外关系、公路、住宅与城市发展、印第安人、国内收入、烟，酒产品与军火、司法行政、劳动、矿产资源、财政金融、国家防御、航运与可航水域、教育、巴拿马运河、公园，森林和公共财产、专利，商标与版权、抚恤金，津贴和老兵救助、邮政服务、环境保护、公共合同与财产管理、公共卫生、公共土地、抢险救灾、公共福利、航运、电讯、联邦收购规则系统、交通、野生动物与渔业。每篇分为若干章（chapter），通常以法规颁发机构的名称为标题，有的章还分为分章（subchapter）；每章包含特定的法规领域的若干部分（part），有的部分由于内容多，又分为分部（subpart）。每部则由包含具体法规的若干节（section）以及段（paragraph）组成。按照内容的多少，联邦法规被整理成卷（volume）。 2. CFR的编纂与修订 1936年以前，联邦政府公报室（Office of Federal Register,OFR）会将联邦政府机构和部门当天发布的所有行政法规、会议纪要、决定、通知以及将要议定的行政法规草案等编辑册，对外公布，周一至周五每周共五册，每年200多册。然而由于法规数量增多，内容庞杂，查询不便等原因，联邦政府在1936年开始参照美国法典（United States Code,USC）的编纂方式进行CFR的编纂。根据44 USC 1510规定，CFR每年至少补充、重新核对出版一次。按季度更新不同篇章。 Title 1~Title 16 每年1月1日更新； Title 17~Title 27每年4月1日更新；
美国联邦调查局 美国联邦调查局，是世界著名的美国最重要的情报机构之一，隶属于美国司法部，英文全称Federal Bureau of Investigation，英文缩写FBI。―FBI‖也不仅是美国联邦调查局的缩写，还代表着该局坚持贯彻的信条——忠诚Fidelity，勇敢Bravery和正直Integrity，是联邦警察。美国联邦调查局根据职能和授权，广泛参与国内外重大特工调查案件，现有的调查司法权已经超过200种联邦罪行。FBI在北京（美驻华大使馆）等世界各地设有办事处。 简要介绍 美国联邦调查局，即Federal Bureau of Investigation，简缩写为FBI。美国重要情报机构。美国最早建立的现代大型情报警务机构，美国司法部下属的主要特工调查部门。于1908年7月26日成立。根据美国法典第28条533款，授权司法部长―委任官员侦测反美国的罪行‖，另外其它联邦的法令给予FBI权力和职责调查特定的罪行。FBI现有的调查司法权已经超过200种联邦罪行。FBI在华盛顿的总部，离白宫只有几条街。[1] 发展历史 美国联邦调查局 在19世纪，政府机构经常雇用（Pinkertons）等私家侦探公司进行破案。直至1908年，美国西部地区的土地非法销售激怒了当时在任的总统西奥多·罗斯福，他授权司法部长查尔斯·约瑟夫·波拿巴（Charles J. Bonaparte）成立一个小型侦探机构，以此来调查这些罪行。1909年5月，该机构拥有了正式名称：调查局(The Bureau of Investigation 简称BOI)。直到1935年7月1日正式改为联邦调查局。约（翰）·埃德加·胡佛在1924年5月10日成为调查局局长。当时调查局花费大量精力调查没有犯罪的政治激进分子(如，社会主义者阿尔贝特·爱因斯坦)。当富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福在任时，提醒胡佛自由主义不是罪行，而应是现任总统和行政部门的政治活动。二十世纪30年代，联邦调查局逮捕了一批臭名昭著的绑架，抢劫和杀人犯，例如约翰·迪林杰, "娃娃脸"尼尔森, 凯特·巴克（人称―巴克妈妈‖）, Alvin Karpis和George "Machine Gun" Kelly。在打击三K党的行动中联邦调查局也扮演了重要角
美国联邦注解法典 第18号罪行以及刑事诉讼 第一部分罪行 第121章访问保存的无线或电信通讯和处理记录 第2701条. 非法访问保存的通讯 （a）入侵，——除非满足本条（c）部分的规定——任何人—— （1）有意在没有授权的情况下访问提供电子通讯服务的设备；或者 （2）有意越权访问设备；并因此获得或改变以电子方式储存于该系统中的无线或电信通讯，或阻止获得授权的他人访问以电子方式储存于该系统中的无线或电信通讯，应被处以（b）部分所规定的惩罚。 （b）惩罚—— 针对(a)部分中规定的入侵行为，可采取以下惩罚措施—— （1）如入侵行为是出于获取商业利益、进行恶意破坏或损坏、个人商业目的、或者进行任何违反美国宪法和美国或各州法律的犯罪或违法行为的目的——（A）对于初次触犯本条法律的犯罪行为，根据本条规定处以罚款或者5年以下的监禁，或者同时进行；并且 （B）对于非初次触犯本条法律的犯罪行为，根据本条规定处以罚款或者10年以下的监禁，或者同时进行；并且 （2）在任何其他情况下—— （A）对于初次触犯本条法律的犯罪行为，根据本条规定处以罚款或者1年以下的监禁，或者同时进行；并且 （B）对于非初次触犯本条法律的犯罪行为，根据本条规定处以罚款或者5年以下的监禁，或者同时进行；并且 （C）例外情况。——第（a）条规定并不适用于以下对象的行为—— （1）提供无线或电信通讯服务的个人或者实体； （2）使用以上服务进行通讯的用户或者试图进行通讯的用户；或者 （3）本节第2703、2704或者2518条中规定的内容。
第2702条.用户的通讯或者记录的自愿透露 (a)禁止——除了第（b）条中规定的内容—— （1）向公众提供电子通讯服务的个人或实体，在使用该服务进行电子存储时，不应故意向任何个人或实体泄漏通讯的内容；并且 （2）向公众提供远程计算机服务的个人或实体，不应故意向任何个人或实体泄漏服务所传递或包含的通讯的内容；并且该服务满足以下条件—— (A)代表该服务的订阅者或用户，通过电子传输（或者依靠电脑对通过电子传输方式接收的来自该服务的订阅者或用户的通讯进行处理而生成）从该服务的订阅者或用户处得到； （B）仅出于向这样的订阅者或用户提供存储或者电脑处理服务，如果提供商没有经过授权，不应出于提供储存或者电脑处理之外的服务的目的进入任何通讯内容；以及 （3）面对公众的远程电脑服务或者电信服务提供商，不应故意向任何政府实体泄漏该服务的订阅者或用户的相关信息（不包括第(1) 段或第(2)段中提到的通讯的内容）。 （b）泄漏通讯的特例——第（a）条中包括的服务提供商应向以下对象或在以下情形下提供通讯的内容—— （1）向此类通讯的发出者或指定接受者或者发出者和指定接受者的代理机构；（2）本部分规定的第2517、2511(2)(a)或2703条中的授权对象； （3）经过这些通讯的创作者、发出者或指定接受者，或者远程计算服务的订阅者合法同意； （4）为了传递这些通讯而被雇用、授权或者提供设备的人员； （5）为保证服务的开展，保护服务提供商的利益及资产而必须的情形下；（6）对于执法机构—— (A)如果内容—— (i)为服务提供商无意中得到；并 (ii)显示与犯罪行为有关；或者 (B)为1990年的犯罪控制法令第227章所要求的； (7)对于联邦、州或者地方政府实体，如果提供商出于善意，相信对任何人员
美国FBI犯罪心理学测试题 第一题：企鹅肉 一个男科学家回忆说：他和他的朋友去南极考察，但是他中途中了雪盲，什么都看不到。所以他们在南极游荡，最后只能生吃企鹅来维持生命。但是他朋友最后还是没有挺住，最后死了。他一个人继续走了一天，最后被救了回去。第二天他特意去企鹅店吃企鹅，但是回来后竟然自杀了。为什么？ 第二题：跳火车 一个人坐火车去临镇看病，看完之后病全好了。回来的路上火车经过一个隧道，这个人就跳车自杀了。为什么？ 第三题：水草 有个男孩跟他女友去河边散步。突然他的女友掉进河里了，那个男孩就急忙跳到水里去找，可没找到他的女友，他伤心的离开了这里。过了几年后，他故地重游，这时看到有个老人在钓鱼，可那老人钓上来的鱼身上没有水草，他就问那老人为什么鱼身上没有沾到一点水草，那老人说：这河从没有长过水草。说到这时，那男孩突然跳到水里自杀了。为什么？ 第四题：葬礼的故事 有母女三人，母亲死了，姐妹俩去参加葬礼。妹妹在葬礼上遇见了一个很有型的男子，并对他一见倾心。回到家后，妹妹把姐姐杀了。为什么？ 第五题：夜半敲门 一个人住在山顶的小屋里，半夜听见有敲门的，他打开门却没有人，于是去睡了。等了一会又有敲门声，去开门，还是没人，如是者几次。第二天，有人在山脚下发现死尸一具，警察来把山顶的那人带走了。为什么？ 第八题：半根火柴 有一个人在沙漠中，头朝下死了，身边散落著几个行李箱子，而这个人手里紧抓著半个火柴。推理这个人是怎么死的？ 第六题：满地木屑 马戏团里有两个侏儒，瞎子侏儒比另一个侏儒矮。马戏团只需要一个侏儒，马戏团的侏儒当然是越矮越好了。两个侏儒决定比谁的个子矮，个子高的就去自杀。可是，在约定比个子的前一天，瞎子侏儒，也就是那个矮的侏儒已经在家里自杀死了，地上残留着许多碎木屑。他为什么自杀？ 第七题：牛吃草 有一个年轻的男人，他的房子和邻居夫妇的房子中间隔着一片草坪。有一天深夜，男人被隔壁的吵架声吵醒，之后他又听到了摔东西声、砍刀子声和牛吃草的声音，过了一会，他又听到了有人撞他家门的声音，但他都没有理会，又睡了过去。第二天，他发现隔壁的女主人惨死在他家门口。推理其过程。 第九题：过山车 有一对恋人去乐园玩，女孩想玩过山车，可男孩有点怕没敢玩，女孩玩了一次后，还想玩，