Social Sciences in China
V ol. XXXII, No. 2, May 2011, 5-18
Three Reversals in the Development of Metaphysics: Reflections on Heidegger’s Theory of Metaphysics
Yu Wujin
School of Philosophy, Fudan Uni v ersity
迄今 为止的西方形而上学发展史是由以下三次翻转构成的： 首先是以笛卡尔、康德和黑格尔为代表的“主体性 形而上学”对柏拉图主义的“在场形而上学 ”的翻转；
其次是在主体性形而上学的内部，以叔本华、尼采为代表的“意志形而上学”对以笛
卡尔、康德和黑格尔为代表的“理性形而上学”的翻转；再次是后期海德格尔的“世
界之四重整体的形而上学”对其前期的“此在形而上学”的翻转。
关键词: 在场形而上学主体性形而上学理性形而上学意志形而上学
此在形而上学世界之四重整体的形而上学
So far, three reversals have occurred in the history of Western metaphysics. The ? rst was
the reversal from the “metaphysics of presence” represented by Platonism to the “metaphysics
of subjectivity” represented by Descartes, Kant and Hegel. The second occurred within
the framework of the metaphysics of subjectivity and marked the transformation f r om the
“metaphysics of reason” represented by Descartes, Kan t and Hegel to the “metaphysics
of will” represented by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The third reversal was from the
“metaphysics of being-there” of the earlier phase of Heidegger’s philos o phy to his later
“metaphysics of the world-fourfold.”
Keywords: metaph y sics of presence, metaphysics of subjectivity, metaphysics of reason, metaphysics of will, metap h ysics of being-there, metaphysics of the world-
fourfold
An in-depth understanding of H e idegger’s theory of metaphysics enables us to see that the history of Western metaphysics is made up of three major “reversals” (Umkehr), with the secret of modernity lying deep within them. In fact, it is precisely the understanding and interpretation of these reversals that opens up a way out of the anxieties of modernity and enables philosophical thought to regain its dignity and retain the commanding heights, and
ISSN 0252-9203
? 2011 Social Sciences in China Press
DOI: 10.1080/02529203.2011.573280
https://www.doczj.com/doc/7e7655512.html,
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thus avoid being buried in the petty thinking of positivism.
I.The First Reversal in the Development of Metaphysics
The first reversal in the development of metaphysics is expressed in the switch from the “metaphysics of presence” represented by Platonism to the “metaphysics of subjectivity” repre s ented by Descartes, Kant and Hegel.
It is well known t h at one of Aristotle’s works is entitled Metaphysics. In Greek, “metaphysics” is written as ταμετ?ταφυσικ?, with μετ? having the meaning of “going beyond.”1 But Aristotle did not invent this phrase. In fact, he calls the science concerned with the study of “beings as such” (being qua being) “the ? rst philosophy.” W. S. Sahakian points out in his Outline History of Philosophy that Andronicus described “? rst philosophy” as a set of principles coming from or going beyond physics (ta meta ta physika) and placed it after the work on physics in his edition of Aristotle’s works.2
Although t h e phase ταμετ?ταφυσικ? was created by Andronicus to r efer to those of Aristotle’s writings placed after his physics, this does not mean that the history of metaphysics began with Aristotle. In his Nietzsche, Heidegger says, “Plato, with whose thought metaphysics begins, understood beings as such, that is, the Being of beings, as ‘Idea.’”3
For Heidegger, Plato was not merely the founder of metaphysics; his philosophy, Platonism, was also the dominant form of metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche. Philosophers like Nietzsche tried to overthrow Plato, but even where such efforts had an effect, the in? uence of Platonism was still decisive. Heidegger even believed that “The incontestable dominance of Platonism in Western philosophy ultimately reveals itself in the fact that philosophy before Plato, which as our earlier discussions have shown was not yet a metaphysics—that is to say, not a developed metaphysics—is interpreted with reference to Plato and is called pre-Platonic philosophy.”4 When Whitehead says that the European philosophical tradition consisted of “a series of footnotes to Plato,” “the European philosophical tradition” obviously refers to philosophy after Plato. Heidegger went even further in showing that Platonism had the effect of “a total eclipse;” that is, our understandin g and inte r pretation of pre-Platonic philosophy are also permeated by Platonism.
Heidegger defined Plato’s metaphysics as the metaphysics of presence (Anwesenheit). What, then, is this “metaphysics of presence”? From the perspective of his phenomenology, Heidegger gives the name “presence” to what is revealed in man’s consciousness, what already exists (“appearance”); he regards the philosophical theory that studies presence and
1 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, S. 58; Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 137.
2 W.S. Sahakian ,Outline History of Philosophy, pp. 65-66. Ta meta ta physika is the Romanization of ταμετ?ταφυσικ?.
3 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 2, p. 904.
4 Ibid., pp. 852-853.
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the forms of presence as the metaphysics of p r esence.5
Heidegger believed that in Plato, “presence” takes two different forms. One is presence as “beings.” “Beings” here represents concrete things, e.g., a house, a horse, a stone, a person, or a picture, the presence of which can be perceived by the senses. The other is presence as “Being,” the generalization of “beings;” that is, “beings” minus all their particularities, which thus become the most universal things. People can only understand and grasp the presence of these universals, which are what Plato called the “idea” (ιδεα) through their own thinking. In Heidegger’s view, Plato did not say anything substantial on “Being” itself; Platonism as the metaphysics of presence concerns itself with the difference in form of presence between “Being” and “beings.”
As everybody knows, Plato saw “Being” or the idea as the most universal thing, original and eternal. It was the origin of all particular things and “beings,” as individual things were but “copies” of the idea. As for works of art representing individual things, they were but “copies of a copy.” As Heidegger said, “Plato de? ned presence as the idea.”6 That is, for Plato, only the idea, i.e., the form of presence of “Being,” was original, eternal and real,7 while the form of presence of “beings,” as individual things or “copies” of the idea, were not reliable b e cause they were changeable and therefore non-original and illusory. As for works of art, as “copies of a copy,” their form of pr e sence was subordinate to that of ordinary “beings” and was therefore even m ore illusory and unreliable. Thus Heidegger points out, “In the sequence of sundry ways taken by the presence of beings, hence by the Being of beings, art stands far below truth in Plato’s metaphysics.”8 Plato’s Republic even drives out artists, especially poets. From the above expositions of Heidegger’s we can deduce the following conclusions. First, Platonism is essentially the metaphysics of presence, which is outward-oriented and concerns itself with the manifestation or presence of all things of the world in human consciousness. In this kind of metaphysics, the singularity of “man” as a being has not been subjectivized and man is treated as the same as other beings such as a house, horse, stone or work of art.
Second, at ? rst glance, the metaphysics of presence represented by Platonism seems to be 5 It must be pointed out that although Heidegger repeatedly discussed the relationship between traditional metaphysics and “presence” and although the concept of the “metaphysics of presence” was poised to come at his call, he did not directly originate this concept. It was Derrida who put it forward after a careful interpretation of Heidegger’s works. Derrida believed that traditional metaphysics “might be a de? nition that takes ‘Being’ as all the meanings of the word “presence” (J. Derrida, L’écriture et la différence, p. 504). In his view, Heidegger criticized the metaphysics of presence but did not break away completely from this metaphysics; “the metaphysics of presence is shaken with the help of the concept of sign” (Ibid., p. 506). Kellner and Best have pointed out, “Derrida termed this foundationalist approach to language and knowledge a ‘meta p hysics of presence’ that supposedly guaranteed the subject an unmediated access to reality.” See Douglas Kellner and Steven Best, Postmodern Theory, p. 27.
6 Heidegger,“The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” p. 1256.
7 Heidegger says, “For Platonism, the Idea, the supersensuous, is the true, true being.” Hei d egger, Nietzsche, vol. 1, p. 169.
8 Ibid., p. 207.
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aware of the difference between “Being” and “beings” and to comprehend the original form of presence as “Being,” i.e., “idea.” However, as it does not realize that only man, the singular “Being” in all the “beings,” is able to take on the mission of inquiring about the meaning of Being, the meaning of Being cannot be highlighted by the metaphysics of presence. So Heidegger believed that the metaphysics of presence would inevitably be replaced by a new theory of metaphysics.
The metaphysics of subjectivity was conceived and developed in the tradition of Platonism, but its mode of operational thought turned out to be a subversion of the metaphysics of presence. In contrast to the metaphysics of presence in which man, the singular being, is treated alike with all other beings, the metaphysics of subjectivity signifies the awakening of the subjective consciousness of man, who puts himself as subject in the center of the whole world of beings. As a result, the forms of manifestation of all the things of the world in human consciousness are reversed. In the metaphysics of presence, man is an ordinary or even an insigni? cant element in the world, while in the metaphysics of subjectivity man is the foundation and center of the whole world. Just as Heidegger said, “Western history has now begun to enter into the completion of that period we call the modern, and which is de? ned by the fact that man becomes the measure and the center of beings. Man is what lies at the bottom of all beings; that is, in modern terms, at the bottom of all objecti? cation and representability,” i.e., Subjectum (general subject).9
Who, then, was the initiator of the metaphysics of subjectivity? In Heidegger’s view, it was the French philosopher Descartes. He wrote, “At the beginning of modern philosophy stands Descartes’ statement: Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). All consciousness of things and of beings as a whole is referred back to the self-consciousness of the human subject as the unshakable ground of all certainty. The reali t y of the real is de? ned in later times as objectivity, as something that is conceived by and for the subject as what is thrown and stands over against it.”10 Clearly, Heidegger holds that the famous proposition, “I think, therefore I am” put forward by Descartes constitutes a hallmark for the establishment of the metaphysics of subjectivity. In the post-Cartesian era, the German philosophers Kant and Hegel took this metaphysics to its highest point. Kant’s metaphor of the “Copernican revolution,” his concept of “transcendental apperception” and his exposition of “understanding makes laws for nature and reason makes laws for freedom” and Hegel’s view t h at the key to all questions was that the real thing should not only be understood and expressed as an entity but should also be
9 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 699. Elsewhere in this work, Heidegger writes, “What is new about the modern period as opposed to the Christian medieval age consists in the fact that man, independently and by his own effort, contrives to become certain and sure of his human being in the midst of beings as a whole.” Ibid., p. 765.
10Ibid., pp. 761-762. Elsewhere in this work Heidegger says more clearly, “Descartes’ metaphysics is the decisive beginning of the foundation of metaphysics in the modern age. It was his task to ground the metaphysical ground of man’s liberation in the new freedom of self-assured self-legislation. Descartes anticipated this ground in an authentically philosophical sense. ” Ibid., p. 778.
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understood and described as a subject11 are all classical expressions of the core concepts of the metaphy s ics of subjectivity.
The essence of the metaphysics of subjectivity is to see man, the singular being, as the determinator of all metaphysical truths. As Heidegger says, “As a metaphysics of subjectivity, modern metaphysics, under whose spell our thinking too stands, or rather inevitably seems to stand, takes it as a foregone conclusion that the essence of truth and the interpretation of Being are determined b y man as the subject proper.”12 Put plainly, with the establishment of the metaphysics of subjectivity, metaphysics has actually been transformed into anthropology. “Thus today one thought is common to everyone, to wit, an ‘anthropological’ thought, which demands that the world be interpreted in accordance with the image of man and that metaphysics be replaced by ‘anthropology.’ In such a demand, a definite decision has already been rendered concerning the relationship of man to beings as such.”13 We ? nd that the reversal of the metaphysics of presence represented by Platonism and its replacement by modern metaphysics, i.e., the metaphysics of subjectivity, represented by Descartes, Kant and Hegel, is expressed mainly in the following ways.
First, the metaphysics of presence adopts an outward-looking way of thought, that is, thought explores outward, serving as the form of presence of being or beings as a whole, while the metaphysics of subjectivity adopts an inward-looking way of thought, that is, thought goes inward to highlight and extract “the self” and “I think” as the object of re? ection. Second, the metaphysics of presence examines and reflects on all beings alike without any discrimination, whereas the metaphysics of subjectivity differentiates between “man,” the singular being (as subjectivity) and other beings (as objectivity) and understands and interprets this subjectivity as the starting point and determinator of all metaphysical truths. Third, the focus of exploration of the metaphysics of presence is the idea as the most universal thing, and the ultimate foundation of the idea is the “Creator,” who, in the context of the Middle Ages, became God, the most fundamental form of presence; while the focus of exploration of the metaphysics of subjectivity is the foundational and key status and role of man as the subject in modern metaphysics. As Heidegger said, “Within the history of the modern age, and as the history of modern mankind, man universally and always independently attempts to establish himself as midpoint and measure in a position of dominance; that is, to pursue the securing of such dominance.”14 It is also in this sense that Heidegger understood the metaphysics of subjectivity as anthropology.
In short, the reversal from the outward-looking metaphysics represented by Platonism to the inward-looking metaphysics of subjectivity represented by Descartes, Kant and Hegel was the ? rst reversal in the development of metaphysics. The decisive result of this re v ersal was that within the realm of beings, man was transformed into subjectum and the world into
11 G.W.F. Hegel, Werke 3, S. 23.
12 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 2, p. 824.
13 Ibid., p. 762.
14 Ibid., p. 777.
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a picture of man.15 Only by starting from this point can we gain a real understanding of the essence of modern metaphysics and modernity.
II.The Second Reversal in the Development of Metaphysics
As mentioned above, for Heidegger modern metaphysics was the same as the metaphysics of subjectivity. The second reversal in the development of metaphysics took place within the wider framework of the metaphysics of subjectivity, from the “metaphysics of reason” to the “metaphysics of will.”
In the metaphysics of subjectivity, “subjectivity” as a speci? c property of man is a very complex concept. On the one hand, philosophers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries usually understood man as a composite of soul and body; on the other, more modern philosophers and contemporary philosophers are inclined to understand man as a composite of reason and unreason (instincts, emotions, will and desire). This tells us that the metaphysics of subjectivity is still an abstract concept and we cannot rely on this concept alone to judge which factor or factors in subjectivity should be given prominence.
Heidegger points out, “Western metaphysics does not de? ne man simply and homologously in every epoch as a creature of reason. The metaphysical inception of the modern age ? rst manifests the historic unfolding of that role in which reason attains its full metaphysical rank.”16 In other words, in the early pe r iod of the establishment and development of modern metaphysics, the dominant form of expression of the metaphysics of subjectivity was the metaphysics of reason, while “The metaphysical essence of reason consists in the fact that being as a whole is projected as a guideline for representational thought and is interpreted as such.”17 In Heidegger’s view, the metaphysics of reason as “representational thought” first appeared in the context of epistemology.
Let us ? rst look at Descartes, the initiator of modern metaphysics, that is, the metaphysics of subjectivity. Although Descartes himself did not use the concept of the “metaphysics of reason,” reason always occupied the fundamental and core position in his entire theory of philosophy.
Despite this, the inherent problems of reason and its limits did not attract his attention. After Descartes, Kant’s explorations of metaphysics made an impressive volte face: instead of thinking of everything on the basis of reason, he took reason as the object of his investigation. “It is obviously the effect not of levity but of the matured judgment of the age, which refuses to be any longer put off with illusory knowledge. It is a call to reason to undertake anew the
15 In his “The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays” (p. 902), Heidegger says “The interweaving of these two events, which for the modern age is decisive—that the world is transformed into picture and man into subjectum—throws light at the same time on the grounding event of modern history, an event that at ? rst glance seems almost absurd.”
16 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 2, p. 925.
17 Ibid., p. 924.
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most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal…This tribunal is no other than the critique of pure reason.”18 Kant provided a critical summary of the philosophical thought of rationalism and empiricism and substantially advanced the metaphysics of reason initiated by Descartes in the following three areas.
Firstly, metaphysics itself is a product of reason. Driven by its nature, human reason has created one metaphysical system after another, but there are numerous contradictions and controversies between these systems; “the battle-? eld of these endless controversies is called metaphysics.”19 In order to change this situation in metaphysical studies, we must make a critical investigation of their origin—“reason.”
Secondly, there are two different forms of the metaphysics of reason: one is “metaphysics as natural endowment” and the other “metaphysics as science.” In Kant’s view, traditional metaphysical theories are subordinate, almost without exception, to “metaphysics as a natural endowment.” The essential feature of this metaphysics is that, driven by its nature, reason applies the category of understanding that is applicable only to the scope of experience to the superexperiential object, i.e., the thing-in-itself, thus falling into fallacious inference, antinomies or ideals.
Thirdly, metaphysics as science is further divided into two different forms of expression: “the metaphysics of nature” and “the metaphysics of morals.”20 The former, Kant believed, lays the foundation for the natural sciences while the latter, that is, the metaphysics of morals, holds an even higher position. In Kant’s metaphysics of morals, the will is absolutely subservient to reason: “We stand under a discipline of reason, and in all our maxims we must not forget our subjection to it, or withdraw anything from it, or by an egotistical illusion detract from the authority of the law (even though it is one given by our own reason), so that we could place the motive of our will (even though it is in accordance with the law) elsewhere than in the law itself and in respect for it.”21 Kant even called will “practical reason” and repeatedly stressed that it is higher than “speculative reason.” But, in fact, his metaphysics of morals is a more important form that he created for the metaphysics of reason.
After Kant, Hegel further developed the metaphysics of reason. However, in spite of the fact that reason is an important symbol of man as subject, it does not represent the whole man, just as a head cannot be counted as the whole body. In short, the metaphysics of reason represented by Descartes, Kant and Hegel was destined to be subverted and reversed.
There are hints of interest in the human body and in desire in ancient philosophy, and modern philosophers like Leibniz and Hegel also discussed these problems; however, the true subversion and reversal of the metaphysics of reason was primarily undertaken by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Of course, this reversal took place within the framework of the metaphysics of subjectivity; as Schopenhauer pointed out, “It [the subject] is accordingly
18 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, AⅪ.
19 Ibid., AⅧ.
20 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 36.
21 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 89.
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the supporter of the world, the universal condition of all that appears, of all objects, and it is always presupposed; for whatever exists, exists for the subject.”22 However, with Schopenhauer, both the concept of “the world” corresponding to the subject and the concept of “man” as synonymous with the subject acquire completely new meanings that never existed in the discourse of Descartes, Kant and Hegel.
For Schopenhauer, the thing-in-itself of which Kant wrote is none other than will, which consists in the essence of the world, while the human body is objecti? ed will that has become a representation. “First I put the will, as things-in-itself, as something wholly original; secondly, its mere visibility, its objectification, namely the body; and thirdly, knowledge as a mere function of a part of this body.”23 Proceeding hence, Schopenhauer subverted the dominant idea put forward by Platonism that knowledge (reason) is primary while will (desire) is secondary, and made a subversive explanation of “man,” the subject. “With me the eternal and indestructible in man, which forms his very principle of life, is not the soul, but, if I may be permitted to use a chemical expression, the radical of the soul, and this is the will. The so-called soul is already a compound word, namely the union of the will with the intellect. This intellect is the secondary element, the posterius of the organism, and, as a mere function of the brain, is conditioned by the organism. The will, on the other hand, is primary, is the prius of the organism, which is conditioned by it.”24 Here, Schopenhauer not only differentiated man’s activities in knowledge from his activities in will, but also said categorically that in the compound organism will is always primary while intellect (whose function is to be engaged in activities in knowledge) is always secondary. “Will is not conditioned by knowledge, as was hitherto assumed without exception, although knowledge is conditioned by will.”25 With the transposition of the relationship between will and knowledge (involving intellect or reason), the metaphysics of reason met its fated reversal.
However, Schopenhauer’s reversal was not complete, because the starting point of his philosophy af? rmed the will to live though its conclusion denied it. In his youth, Nietzsche was strongly influenced by Schopenhauer; it was not until around 1876 that he began to realize the fundamental difference between Schopenhauer and himself. If we say that Schopenhauer indulged in the ideals of moralistic Christianity and therefore denied the will to live, then Nietzsche pleaded for life.26 What is life? Nietzsche replied: “Life is will to power.”27 For Schopenhauer, life could only maintain itself passively and “Ultimately death must triumph, for by birth it has already become our lot.” Hence “life swings like a pendulum to and fro between pain and boredom.”28 For Nietzsche, however, the essence of life was to
22 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, p.28.
23 Schopenhauer, On the Will in Nature, p. 35.
24 Ibid., p. 34.
25 Ibid., p. 20.
26 Nietzsche, Will to Power, pp. 405 and 434.
27 Ibid., p. 190.
28 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, p. 427.
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preserve and improve itself and to win the power to dominate other wills.
It was through starting with the basic theory of the will to power that Nietzsche surpassed Schopenhauer and completely reversed the metaphysics of reason represented by Schopenhauer, Kant and Hegel.
Nietzsche reversed not only the relationship between the will (desire) and reason (knowledge), but also that between mind (soul) and body (soma); as Heidegger puts it: “Body is the name for that con? guration of will to power in which the latter is always immediately accessible, because it is always within the province of man identi? ed as ‘subject.’ Nietzsche therefore says: ‘Essential: to start from the body and employ it as the guideline.’”29
It can thus be seen from the foregoing that through the transposition of the will (desire) and reason (knowledge) Schopenhauer reversed the metaphysics of reason represented by Descartes, Kant and Hegel and made it the metaphysics of the will, while Nietzsche, starting from the theory of the will to power, went further and overturned the relationship between the mind (soul) and body (soma) and thus reversed the metaphysics of reason and made it the metaphysics of will to power.30
Within the wider framework of the metaphysics of subjectivity, Nietzsche subverted the metaphysics of reason represented by Descartes, Kant and Hegel and replaced it with the metaphysics of will to power, thus completing the second reversal in the development of metaphysics. Through the important concept of the will to power, Nietzsche developed all the implications of the metaphysics of subjectivity to the fullest possible extent.
III.The Third Reversal in the Development of Metaphysics
The third reversal in the development of metaphysics appears in the process of the development of Heidegger’s philosophy. We might call it the reversal from the “metaphysics of being-there (Dasein)” to the “metaphysics of the world-fourfold.”
As is well known, Heidegger’s metaphysical thinking developed around the “metaphysics of being-there.” In his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, he wrote, “The metaphysics of Dasein as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics has its own truth, which in its essence is as yet all too obscure.”31 In the metaphysics of being-there, being-there is a fundamental core concept.
For Heidegger, the form of being of Dasein as the being of man can be nothing but existence, and existence inherently means “being-in-this-world.” In other words, existence involves “being with (Mitsein)” others and the world. Therefore, being-there as “being-in-this-world” is the true and original starting point for exploring all questions of metaphysics: “The constitution of the Dasein’s existence as being-in-the-world emerged as a peculiar
29 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 2, p. 931.
30 Ibid., p. 906.
31 Heidegger,“Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,” p. 125.
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transposition of the subject which makes up the phenomenon which we shall yet more particularly define as the Dasein’s transcendence.”32 In other words, the subjectivity that modern metaphysics takes as its starting point is grounded in the existential structure of being-there and it is precisely the transcendence of being-there in this existential structure that throws light on the concept of subjectivity. Thus we find that, through its exposition of the inherent existential structure of being-there, Heidegger’s metaphysics of being-there far exceeds the superficial forms of the metaphysics of subjectivity of philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche.
Starting from analysis of the existential structure of being-there, Heidegger distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic states in the existence of being-there and elucidates the issues of “care,” “dread,” “death,” “conscience,” “decision,” “temporality” and “historicity,” thus constructing the system of the metaphysics of being-there. However, Heidegger’s metaphysical thinking in his later period indicates that he not only transcended the metaphysics of being-there of his early period but also undertook an outward reversal of it, making it the “metaphysics of the world-fourfold.” Why did this reversal in Heidegger’s thinking on metaphysics take place? We believe it was due to the following causes.
On the one hand, both in his Being and Time and in “The Self-af? rmation of the German University,” his inaugural speech as the Rector of Freiburg University, the early Heidegger placed his hopes on what he called “authentic being-there” (that is, the German elites as he saw them, such as Hitler, Heidegger himself, and so on) to change Germany’s post-World War I image of pettiness and inferiority. However, with his resignation from this position in April 1934, his plan for the reform of German universities was thwarted and his relations with the Nazi authorities became tense. In his later period, Heidegger had a deep understanding of the limited use of “authentic being-there” and realized that only by complying with the truth revealed by being itself would it play its due role.
On the other hand, although in his early period Heidegger substituted the existential structure of being-there for subjectivity, the metaphysics of being-there does, after all, take being-there as its basis and starting point. Heidegger himself says in “On the Essence of Ground” that some people criticized his Being and Time for its anthropocentric position.33 Despite his rejection of this criticism, his discussions on “care,” “dread,” “death” and “mortal being,” on “utensils,” “indication” and “integrated involvement” and on “idle talk,” “curiosity,” “ambiguity” and “falling” all revolve around the being-there of man. So the early Heidegger’s metaphysics of being-there can also be understood, in a sense, as a “fine edition of the metaphysics of will to power.” But insofar as its essence is concerned, this metaphysical theory is still not completely free of the shadow of modern metaphysics, i.e., the metaphysics of subjectivity.
For these reasons, Heidegger came to realize that the metaphysics of being-there of his 32 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 232.
33 Heidegger, “On the Essence of Ground,” p.196.
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early period must make a fresh start, that is, the limitations to the role of being-there should be elevated to the theme of the new era. As a result, in his later period Heidegger changed his earlier approach to metaphysical thinking and proposed the metaphysical theory of the “world-fourfold.” In his view, the “world-fourfold” refers to “the earth and the sky, the divine and the mortal.” In “The Thing,” he gives a brief explanation of these four concepts: “Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and framing, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal…The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, the year’s seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether… The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment…mortals are… human beings. They are called mortals because they can die…Each of the fourfold—the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals—belong together by way of a simple uni? ed fourfold. Each of the four mirrors in its own way the presence of the others. At the same time, each of the fourfold mirrors itself in its own way and enters into its own within the simple onefold of the fourfold.”34 From the above and other relevant expositions we can infer the following conclusions: ? rst, in the early metaphysics of being-there, being-there was the foundation and core of the world, but in the later metaphysics of the world-fourfold, mortals were relegated to one element of the world-fourfold. Heidegger says: “This enowning mirror-play of the simple onefold of the earth and sky, divinities and mortals, we call the world.”35 This reveals to us that in the overall structure of the world, the subjectivity of man is strictly limited. Man must never destroy the fourfold; only thus will this “enowning mirror-play” be sustained forever.
Two, in the early metaphysics of being-there, being-there had an important historic mission: arousing its own “conscience,” making “decisions” and changing and creating history in its own way. By contrast, in the metaphysics of the world-fourfold of the later period, the mission of mortals was only dwelling in a simple way. In Heidegger’s view, dwelling was the form of being for mortals. Saving the earth, receiving the sky, awaiting the divinities and initiating mortals: this fourfold preservation constituted the simple essence of dwelling.36
Third, in his early metaphysics of being-there, Heidegger attached importance to starting from the discourse of being-there in his understanding of language phenomena. He said, “it [discourse] is language…In language, as a way things have been expressed or spoken out, there is hidden a way in which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted.”37 However, in the metaphysics of world-fourfold in the later period, Heidegger maintains that in inquiring into language we should not pull language to the side of being-there; on the contrary, we
34 Heidegger, “The Thing,” p. 196.
35 Ibid., p. 1180.
36 Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” p. 1201.
37 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 203-204.
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should bring the mortals to the essence of language. “Language, then, is not a mere human faculty. Its character belongs to the very character of the movement of the face-to-face encounter of the world’s four regions.”38 That is to say, the essence of language is to guard the earth, the sky, divinities and mortals so that they will live forever face to face and on intimate terms, while any mortal discourse must always comply with the essence of language.
IV.Brief Conclusions
Summing up these three reversals we can come to the following four conclusions: ? rst, in spite of the fact that the second reversal takes place in the wider framework of the metaphysics of subjectivity, it is no less signi? cant than the ? rst reversal. This is because the ? rst reversal still occurred in the rationalist tradition, while the second expounds, through subversion of the traditional relationship between reason and will, the primordial nature of will that exists in an irrational way, thus inspiring us to solve the mystery of modernity.
Second, Heidegger repeatedly stated that the metaphysics of being-there he advanced in his early period and modern metaphysics (the metaphysics of subjectivity) came from completely different starting points; however, in a sense, it was the metaphysics of being-there that provided the metaphysics of subjectivity with a solid intellectual foundation through the clari? cation of the existential structure of being-there, i.e., being-in-the-world. In this sense, Heidegger’s metaphysics of being-there as a “? ne edition of the metaphysics of the will to power” does not ultimately emerge from the shadow of the metaphysics of subjectivity. Third, the metaphysics of world-fourfold advanced by Heidegger in his later period seems to transcend metaphysics through poetical “thinking.” In fact, what he transcends is traditional metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche and the metaphysics of being-there he advocated in his early period. In brief, Heidegger’s “thinking” in his later period still falls within the scope of metaphysics, but it re? ects a new form of metaphysical thinking that differs from traditional metaphysics. At first glance, the metaphysics of world-fourfold seems to be regression to the metaphysics of presence of Platonism, but in fact it is not. The fundamental difference between the two is that according to Platonism, all things of presence, including humans, are ready-to-hand beings. Since the difference between man and other beings has not been subjectivized and since only man is able to inquire about the meaning of being, the metaphysics of presence is con? ned to “beings” to the neglect of “being” itself. For the later Heidegger, mortals, as close neighbors of being in the world-fourfold, are already aware of their limited capabilities and consciously shoulder the task of complying with the doctrine of being and guarding the fourfold in their dwelling.
Fourth, our using the “three reversals” to sum up the history of metaphysics to the present day does not mean we agree with what is known as the “theory of the end of metaphysics” or with Habermas’ and Rorty’s ill-considered use of the concept “post-metaphysics.” In
38 Heidegger, “On the Way to Language,” p. 1119.
Yu Wujin17
reality, people can neither free themselves from metaphysics nor put an end to metaphysical thinking. Our studies of the development of metaphysics are aimed at gaining a more in-depth understanding of the essence of metaphysics and trends in its future development, with a view to ensuring that our re? ections on man’s destiny and, in particular, our explorations of modernity will always be at the high level that is philosophy’s due.
Notes on Contributor
Yu Wujin is a Cheung Kong Professor at Fudan University, appointed by the Chinese Ministry of Education; Director of the Fudan University Center of Contemporary Marxist Studies Abroad (based in the Ministry of Education); and Head of the Foreign Philosophical Discipline Project of the School of Philosophy of Fudan University. His main academic interests are the history of foreign philosophy and Marxist studies abroad. His representative books include On Ideology (意识形态论, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, revised edition, 2009), Conversion of the Problem Domain: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Relationship between Marx and Hegel (问题域的转换：对马克思和黑格尔关系的当代解读, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2007) and From Kant to Marx (从康德到马克思, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2004). Representative papers include “The Two Kantian Notions of Causality: An Analytical Inquiry” (康德两种因果观探析, Zhongguo Shehui Kexue [中国社会科学], 2007, no. 6) and “On Marx’s Sublation of the German Classical Philosophical Heritage” (论马克思对德国古典哲学遗产的扬弃, Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 2006, no. 2). Mailing address: School of Philosophy, Fudan University, 220 Handan Road, Shanghai, 200433. E-mail: yuwujin@https://www.doczj.com/doc/7e7655512.html,.
References
Derrida, J. L’écriture et la différence. vol. 2. Trans. Zhang Ning. Beijing: The SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2001.
Hegel, G.W.F. Werke 3. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986.
Heidegger, Martin. “Building, Dwelling, Thinking.” In Selected Works of Martin Heidegger (海德格尔选集), vol. 2. Ed. Sun Zhouxing. Shanghai: The SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996. Heidegger, Martin. “Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.” In Selected Works of Martin Heidegger, vol. 1. Ed. Sun Zhouxing. Shanghai: The SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996.
Heidegger, Martin. “On the Essence of Ground.” In Selected Works of Martin Heidegger, vol. 1. Ed. Sun Zhouxing. Shanghai: The SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996.
Heidegger, Martin. “On the Way to Language.” In Selected Works of Martin Heidegger, vol. 2. Ed. Sun Zhouxing. Shanghai: The SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996.
Heidegger, Martin. “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.” In Selected Works of Martin Heidegger , vol. 2. Ed. Sun Zhouxing. Shanghai: The SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996. Heidegger, Martin. “The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays.” In Selected Works of Martin Heidegger, vol. 2. Ed. Sun Zhouxing. Shanghai: The SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996.
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Heidegger, Martin. “The Thing.” In Selected Works of Martin Heidegger, vol. 1. Ed. Sun Zhouxing. Shanghai: The SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. Chen Jiaying et al. Beijing: The SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987.
Heidegger, Martin. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1983. Heidegger, Martin. Nietzsche. Trans. Sun Zhouxing. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2000. Heidegger, Martin. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Trans. Ding Yun. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2008.
Heidegger, Martin. Wegmarken. Trans. Sun Zhouxing. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2000.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Han Shuifa. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Li Qiuling. Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2004.
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Miao Litian. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1986.
Kellner, Douglas and Steven Best. Postmodern Theory. Trans. Zhang Zhibin. Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2001.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Will to Power. Trans. Sun Zhouxing. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2007. Sahakian, W.S. Outline History of Philosophy. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. On the Will in Nature. Trans. Ren Li et al. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1997. Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation. Trans. Shi Chongbai. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982.
—Translated by Liu Ruixiang from
Zhongguo Shehui Kexue (中国社会科学), 2009, no. 6
Revised by Sally Borthwick
主体主义的最终克服与现象学由胡塞尔通向海德格尔之路 人们经常说海德格尔的现象学是胡塞尔现象学的发展，可是究竟是怎样发展的呢？大多数时候我们其实都不甚了了。仿佛海德格尔只是从弗莱堡的胡塞尔那里学到了?现象学的看?，然后用这种?看?去考虑他自己的问题。因为从表面上看来胡塞尔和海德格尔两人的旨趣和风格都是迥然相异，以至于翻译《观念1》的李幼蒸先生在译后记中呼吁将两人完全分开对待。不过我认为，除了在一定程度上都采用?现象学方法?， 两人思想的内在联系也是非常密切的——否则光凭现象学方法（何况他们二人的现象学方法具体来说是不同的）何以说海氏的思想是胡塞尔的发展，却从来没人说舍勒的思想是胡塞尔的发展呢？但是这种思想上的内在联系不是市面上某些一般性的论断——比如说胡塞尔考察的是认识问题，海氏是存在问题；或者说胡塞尔没有摆脱近代主体哲学的影响而海氏彻底摆脱了——可以澄清的，因为澄清这一联系恰恰要求的是给出这些论断的根据。这篇短文想从其中一个角度对这一联系加以探讨，看看胡塞尔的现象学如何为海氏的某些基本思想提供了线索。 抱歉给这篇文章起了一个这么长又这么零碎的题目，这是因为它其实是两篇文章。由于第二篇（本文的第二部分）的理解有待第一篇（第一部分），于是就把它们硬凑到一起了。两部分的连接十分滞涩，还请读者多担待。整篇文章描绘了一条上升的道路。其中第一部分讨论了胡塞尔现象学由?直观?向?构造?的推进，而第二部分则联系海德格尔的解释学思想，讨论了直观与解释之间的关系，梳理出了由胡塞尔的?事情本身?向海德格尔的?事情本身?的进路。 一，直观与构造 现象学的口号?Zu den Sachen selbst!?不仅要求?面向实事?，并且要求回到?实事本身?。也就是说，要在事物自身中把握事物。对于胡塞尔来说，作为思想的?零点?的
海德格尔自由观 海德格尔认为，存在是存在者得以存在的存在，是没有任何限制的终极本体。只有存在本身才使那种摆脱了任何限制的自由成为现实，而在他之前所有的哲学都只是存在者意义上的存在，都是受限制的、处于“遮蔽”状态的存在者，而不是存在意义上的、绝对的存在，无法实现绝对的自由。也就是说，在他之前所有的哲学都不能解决存在的问题，从而也就谈不上解决自由的问题。任何存在者都只是一种受限制的存在，只有“存在”本身才是没有限制的真正本体意义上（也就是他所谓的存在意义）的自由存在。他于是从“存在”的无限性推出了“自由”的绝对性。 但是，“存在”这一绝对的、没有任何限制的本体的假设必然会导致一种虚无主义的错误。也就是说，那种没有任何限制、自己决定自己的最终实体是不存在的。因为所谓没有任何外在限制的存在，也就是没有任何外在关系的存在，而关系就是属性，也就是本质的外在表现。那么，没有任何外在关系的限制，也就是没有任何属性和没有任何本质的存在，而没有本质及属性就是不存在！ 从另一个角度而言，时空总是关系的时空，任何的存在总是一定关系中的时空存在，关系既时空，关系外的存在也必然是时空外的存在，而时空之外的存在也就是不存在。没有联系就没有本质，也就没有物的存在，更谈不上什么物的自由了。这显然是一种存在和自由的悖论。 何况，关系既差异，差异也就是关系。那种自我同一的绝对本体，因为与外部没有任何的关系，也就意味着它与外部没有任何的差异，那么，内在的本体就是外在的现象，没有任何差异的完全相同的两片树叶，也就是自身绝对同一的、没有任何关系的一片树叶。一方面，绝无限制的存在就是世界本身，另一方面，存在和世界又是完全不同的两个差异。这就是绝对本体的悖论。这或许是绝对本体论者所不愿看见的，然而，这却是一个逻辑事实。本体与外在世界的区别于是就变得毫无意义。 海德格尔否定了在他之前几千年哲学的本体（存在），但他忽略了这一点，既当他把在他之前的存在（本体）存在者化的时候，也就是把存在者存在（本体）化。从这个作为自己逻辑前提的悖论出发，海德格而终其一生，也没有找到自己所苦苦追寻的“存在”究竟在那儿，他最后只能承认，自己所有的工作只是一条没有终点的“探索存在的路”。 因此，绝对自由赖以为基础的绝对本体“存在”，只是一个逻辑的虚构，以此虚无本体为基础，我们就可以得出这样一个诡辩——自由就是虚无，就是没有任何限制的无。绝对的自由的大厦因此也就轰然倒塌。 而且，作为最抽象的思辨哲学家之一，海德格尔这一个迂回曲折的关于存在意义上的自由思想，也似乎没有超过最感性的经验哲学家休谟多少。早在《存在与时间》（1927年）出版187年以前的1740年，休谟就在自己的《人性论》中认为，任何的存在者，无论如何自由自在地发展，无论如何自己决定自己，但由于受制于自己的存在（内在必然的本质），因而这种自由发展本质上都是不自由的。他说：“每一个物体向什么方向发展以及发展到什么样的程度，取决于一种绝对的必然性，而事物不仅无法把自己改变成一个天使、灵魂或者是任何的超自然的存在，甚至不能丝毫偏离他自己正在运行于其中的、被精确设计的路线。”[①]他认为这种受制于必然性的物体本质上仍然是一种“限制”，根本无自由可言，那么，他所谓
海德格尔哲学——张志伟 海德格尔（ Martin Heidegger，1889－1976 ） 《存在与时间》《康德与形而上学问题》《林中路》《路标》 海德格尔的前期哲学将存在与时间联系起来，使形而上学－存在论呈现为完全不同的局面。海德格尔的后期哲学则探索了通往存在的不同道路。 结构： 一、存在问题 二、此在的世界 三、此在的沉沦 四、向死而在 五、海德格尔与老庄 一、存在问题 《存在与时间》（1927） 海德格尔前期思想的代表是《存在与时间》。《存在与时间》的出发点，也是海德格尔从现象学接受过来的思想，就是要破处传统西方哲学主客二元式的认识论框架，深入到主体客体分化之前更深层次的源始境域里去解决存在问题。 当你们用“存在着”这个词的时候，显然你们早就很熟悉这究竟是什么意思了，不过，虽然我们也曾相信领会了它，现在却茫然失措了。－－柏拉图 科学思维方式 通过抽象的理性认识把握事物的本质： （1）玫瑰花、牡丹花……“花”； （2）花、草、树、木……“植物”； （3）植物、动物……“生物”； （4）生物、非生物……存在物； （5）所有的存在物……“存在”。 作为主客二元式的认识论框架，科学思维方式看起来似乎越向上抽象越接近客观实在，而实际上归根结底封闭于主观性之中。而且存在是不可能通过无限的抽象获得的，不仅如此，存在与存在物是完全不同的两个层面的问题，并不是抽象到最高的层面才会抽象出存在，实际上最高层次的存在物与最低层次的存在物都“存在”。 在的遗忘 存在是什么＝存在物是什么 混淆了存在与存在者之间的差别 存在（Sein，Being） 存在：Being－to be Sein－zu sein 存在＝去存在 ＝生成的境域 ＝生生不已的源泉 那么，我们怎样追问存在的意义？虽然存在者都是因存在而存在的，但是一问到存在，总是存在者的存在，所以必须从存在者入手追问存在的意义。这就要求我们找到一种存在者，这种存在者与存在有“存在论”的关系，即是说，这种存在者是由存在规定的，它能够追问存在并且因它的存在而使存在显现出来，这就是我们向来所是的在者，海德格尔称之为“此在”（Dasein）。 一切在者都因存在而存在，但当它们存在时，存在却隐而不显了，唯独“此在”这种在者其本性独特，它始终处在“去存在”（zu sein，to be）的过程之中，因而它的存在就是存在的显现。我们不要把自己与自己的存在看作是两回事：我们始终存在着，存在在我们的行动中存在出来，显现了出来。因此，此在是存在的“澄明”或“林中空地”（Lichtung）。
大三 帖子 125 精华 积分 282 威望 金钱 137 石头 阅读权限 30 一、导言任何一个了解《存在与时间》的人都知道,海德格尔在这一著作中试图摧毁关于知识对实践的优先性的笛卡尔传统.初看起来,海德格尔的确试图把这一传统简单地颠倒过来,即 论述纯粹的沉思是对日常经验内容的否定的修正.更为特别的是,他青起来是说这纯粹的 、赋予意义的知的主体仍然处在胡塞尔现象学的核心,它必须被有所牵涉的、赋予意义的 行的主体所代替.但是一个人如果简单地颠倒传统,那他就要冒被误解和重新估价的风险 ,而且胡塞尔现象学的最佳注释者达格芬·弗勒斯达尔(Dagfonn Fllesdal)就不被误导至 低估海德格尔在这一点上的独创性.在一篇论述胡塞尔和海德格尔有关行动的作用的文章 中,弗勒斯达尔这样来解释海德格尔,即认为胡塞尔相传统过度强调了纯粹的沉思,他也 同意他所认为的海德格尔的观点,即实践活动是主体赋予客体以意义的基本方式. "一般认为,实践活动预设了对世界的理论的理解……海德格尔反对这一点.他把我们处 理世界的实践方式看作比理论更为基本.……海德格尔的这一观点即……人的活动在我们 建构世界中发生作用的观点以及他对其发生方式的分析,在我看来是海德格尔对哲学的主 要贡献". 弗勒斯达尔指出:"胡塞尔在1916年来到弗莱堡之后,显然越来越意识到我们的实践活动 是我们与世界关系的一个重要部分."他然后试图决定现象学中对实践活动的这一新兴趣 应当归功于谁.他写道:"胡塞尔有可能在这——'实践的'新方向上影响了海德格尔, "但他也承认,"也有可能是胡塞尔在与年轻的海德格尔讨论时受到了这一方面的影响. " 然而我要论证的是,一当人们看到海德格尔在这一问题上与胡塞尔的区别的深度,影响的 问题就显得无关重要了.有的问题比实践与理论的关系重要得多.真正的问题关系到对意 向性的两种对立的说明.正如弗兰兹·布伦塔诺和后来的胡塞尔所采用的那样,"意向性 "指出了这样的事实,即感知、相信、欲求、惧怕、怀疑等精神状态总是关于某个事物的 ,也就是总对着加以描述的某个事物,无论这一超精神的客体存在与否.使这种指向得以 实现的精神特质被称为精神状态的表征的或意向的内容.弗勒斯达尔在集中讨论行动的意 向内容对思想的意向内容的相对重要性时,忽视了海德格尔的激进观点,即以精神内容对 意向性的说明预设了但却忽略了更为基本的意向性类型一—一种完全不包括意向内容的意 向性.海德格尔不想使实践活动处于首要地位;他想表明实践活动和沉思的认知都不能被 理解为自我满足的主体及其意向内容与独立的客体之间的关系. 弗勒斯达尔断定领海德格尔所反对的是关于实践的传统的表征理论.海德格尔试图打破这 一哲学传统,他集中于努力超越这些观点所预设的主体/客体之分.他在1929年的一次讲 演中说:"我的实质意图是首先提出(主/客关系)问题,然后这样来论证,即整个西方传
在海德格尔看来，技术是一种现象学意义上的“现象”，正是由于作为“现象”的技术蔽而不显，使得通常关于技术的诸多议论远离技术的本质，对技术的本质视而不见。海德格尔的技术之思就在于使技术这种“现象”澄明起来。技术作为“现象”的深藏不露，与西方的形而上学传统密切相关。特别是在近代，这个通过科技的繁荣而使形而上学极度发达的时代，技术正是作为完成了的形而上学在起作用。 “技术这个名称本质上应被理解成‘完成了的形而上学’” 正是“形而上学的完成”这个维度规定了海德格尔技术之思的走向。 技术作为真理的发生方式：质疑技术中立论 海德格尔思想的基本特征就在于超越存在者的层面，直追存在本身。如果他真的把运思的焦点对准了“技术”，那么，技术就不是在通常意义上所理解的技术，技术就一定承担着让存在者的存在得以开显的决定性角色，也就是说，技术必定要作为真理发生的方式，因为在海德格尔看来，真理就是开显。 通常人们都说，技术是今天最显著的现象，因为我们在这儿那儿到处都碰到技术的东西，技术占据着我们生活中的一切空间。然而，这里说的“现象”绝不是现象学意义上的“现象”。 在这个技术支配一切的时代，技术的本质作为一种“现象”反而可能是最不显著的。在时下关于技术的众多谈论甚至争论中，人们关于技术事实上形成了一种海德格尔称为流俗的技术概念：它把技术看成是工具，看成是人的行为。由于共同的禀承这种工具论的和人类学的技术观，海德格尔称那些表面上对立的双方——盲目的推动技术者和无助的反抗技术者——始终是一回事。说他们是一回事并不是说他们持有相同的观点，也不只是说他们有着某种共同“语言”，而是说，他们对于他们共同持有的技术观完全缺乏反思，特别是，在他们双方或多或少持有的技术中立的看法中，这种反思被完全消解和完全放弃了。 人们为何会持有技术中立观，以及为何会放弃对工具论和人类学的技术观的反思呢？因为它们是正确的。在我们遭遇到的各式各样的技术的东西中，哪一样都是人们为着某种用途和目的而制造的工具，无论这些工具是简单的还是复杂的、是古代的还是现代的。 而在我们这个时代，正确的东西又往往与真理相混同。然而，正确的东西并不等于真理。正确的东西总是活跃在某种开显之中，它是同处一个平面上的存在者之间的某种对位和错位，为着成为正确的东西恰恰并不需要使这种无蔽向我们显现出来。因此，在正确的东西那里，事情的本质尚未揭示出来，毋宁说，在正确的东西那里，真理恰恰被遮蔽起来。 因为工具论的技术观是正确的，人们就因此不再追问“工具”和“手段”是怎么一回事，把它们看成自明的东西，这就错失了“真理”──那使得正确性得以成为正确性的东西。因此，为了由正确性深入到真理，我们就得进一步追问“工具”和“手段”意味着什么。 我们先从工具论（instrumental）的技术概念入手。通常的工具论总是带有“工具”与“目的”相分离的性质，以致人们常常把工具论也就看成是工具中立论。工具与目的相分离之后，工具获得了独立发展的空间，而且不受制于目的，相反，它仿佛自己可以选择和决定目的，
技术的本质问题 ——我读海德格尔《技术的追问》 摘要：海德格尔在《技术的追问》一文中对技术和现代技术进行了一系列追问，他认为技术是一种解蔽方式，座架是现代技术的本质特征，座架以及由之产生的进步强制规定并统治着当今的整个社会现实，现代技术是座架起支配作用的解蔽方式，从而揭示出技术的本质以及人与技术的关系。 关键字：海德格尔；技术；本质；解蔽 《技术的追问》是海德格尔1953年11月18日在慕尼黑理工学院所做的演讲。据记载,这也许是二战后海德格尔最为成功的讲演。当他用“追问是思之虔诚”来结束演讲时,回应他的不是肃穆静默,而是全场起立与掌声。人们把海德格尔的登台看做西洋美声咏叹调的演唱。[1]这场演讲之所以会引起如此热烈的反响,与此种追问的双重性质有关。首先,海德格尔从存在之思的角度深思了技术之本质。在他看来,技术既不是某种合乎目的的手段,也不是某种中性的东西。相反,技术在本质上是一种解蔽方式。其次,对海德格尔来说,此种追问并不是一种以对技术的认识为目标的问题,也不是一个致力于认识所谓“技术”的起源和发展的历史学问题。相反,此种追问是一个关涉我们当代人类此在的历史性问题。一方面,此种追问本身就是由进行追问活动的此在的根本性境况所规定的。我们此时此地的此在是由科学技术来规定的。科学技术已然成了我们的激情,成了我们时代的命运。因此,技术之追问就是要从发问者此在的本质处境出发深思技术之本质,并且希望借此准备一种与技术的自由关系。另一方面,此种追问的发生与哲学的当代处境密切相关。如果说19世纪把对技术进步的信仰同有保证的自由、至善至美的文明的满怀信心的期待统一起来的话,那么,随着相继爆发的两次世界大战,这一切都被牢牢地归入过去的范围。在这种处境中,思想面临着一项迫切的任务,即如何切中当今社会现实的问题———在一个完全由科学技术支配的社会现实中人如何能够理解自身。 一、技术是一种解蔽方式 通行的技术观认为技术是合目的的工具或是人的行为，海德格尔把它称为工具的和人类学的技术规定。海德格尔认为这一规定是正确性，但他又认为，
胡塞尔与海德格尔的存在问题 1962年9月11—13日， 海德格尔在黑森林托特瑙堡主持了关于他的?时间与存在?演讲的研讨课，在讨论记录中可以读到这样的看法：?胡塞尔本人在《逻辑研究》中——主要是在第六研究中——已经接近了本真的存在问题，但他在当时的哲学气氛中无法将它坚持到底?（注：参见：海德格尔Zur Sache des Denkens, Tübingen 1988, S. 47. 以下简称：SD。）。 1973年9月6日，在海德格尔主持的弗莱堡采林根研讨课上，首先讨论的出发点问题是：?在何种程度上可以说，在胡塞尔那里没有存在问题？?（注：参见：海德格尔，Vier Seminare, Frankfurt a. M.1977, S. 111. 以下简称：VS。） 我们试图接着这里的问题思考下去。 在海德格尔所主张的存在论的意义上，不仅胡塞尔，而且整个在他之前的西方哲学（从古希腊到黑格尔），应当说都从没有真正地接触到存在问题。（注：严格地说，海德格尔认为，希腊哲学并非没有接触到存在问题，而是从存在出发，逐渐偏离开存在，因此西方哲学的历史是遗忘存在的历史。勒维纳斯在这个意义上进一步阐释说，西方哲学史试图从存在出发去达到一个完整地包容存在的存在者——上帝。（参见：E.Levinas,Le Temps et l'Autre, Montpellier 1979, p.24）据此而论，在胡塞尔那里没有存在问题（即没有海德格尔式的存在问题），这实际上是不成为问题的。（注：胡塞尔本人当然具有他自己意义上的?存在问题?（参见拙著：Das Problem des Seinsglaubens in derPhanomenologie Edmund Husserls —Ein Versuch mit ihm,Dissertation, Darmstadt, 1990）．概括地说， 他将纯粹意识领域视作真正的存在（参见胡塞尔在《纯粹现象学与现象学哲学的观念》第 1卷第46节中的论述；也可参见海德格尔在《时间概念历史导引》第11节中对胡塞尔这个意义上的存在的四重定义：意识作为?内在的存在?、?绝对的存在?、?被给予的存在?和?纯粹的存在?）；并且，胡塞尔在此意义上划分出他自己的?形式存在论?和?质料存在论?（对此可以参见《纯粹现象学与现象学哲学的观念》第1卷的第153节，以及该书的整个第2、3两卷的论述）。但我们在这里讨论的不是胡塞尔意义上的，而是海德格尔意义上的存在问题。） 但在什么样的意义上又可以说，胡塞尔曾经在《逻辑研究》中接近过本真的存在问题？对这个问题的进一步探讨要取决于对另外一个前问题的回答：海德格尔本人在存在问题上究竟从《逻辑研究》中获益多少？因为，如果对后一个的问题的回答是完全否定的，那么我们在这里也就根本没有必要将这两人的存在问题放在一起讨论。 因此，这里的问题在于：《逻辑研究》——它曾是胡塞尔与海德格尔在存在问题上的一个交会点吗？撇开海德格尔对《逻辑研究》作用的多次一般性强调不论（注：例如参见：海德格尔，GA 20, S.30 （海德格尔全集本均用简称：GA，不再引书名），Sein und Zeit, Tübingen1979,S.38（以下简称：SuZ），Unterwegs zur Sprache, Pflingen1990, S. 90—91（以下简称：US），以及其他各处。海德格尔多次将《逻辑研究》称作现象学的?突破性著作?和现象学的?基本书?（Grundbuch）。），在早期（1925年）的马堡讲座中，他确定有必要坚持胡塞尔在《逻辑研究》（第六研究，第五章和第六章）中所区分的两个真理概念和两个存在概念，因为?我们以后会提出关于存在意义的原则问题?（注：海德格尔，GA20，S.73.重点号为原作者所加。）； 在后期《我的现象学之路》（1963年）一文中，他再次明确指出了《逻辑研究》在存在问题
海德格尔存在论基础上的技术观 摘要：作为一位活在20世纪的现代人，海德格尔与现代技术世界似乎有一种天然的隔膜，他不断的对技术进行追问，并认为造成当今人类生存困境的根源并不是现代技术手段本身的优劣，而是由现代技术的本质一一座架这种解蔽方式所决定的，他对技术的批判是建立在他对“存在”问题的沉思之上的，本文主要从海德格尔存在论视域下来把握其技术批判理论，同时又反过来从技术批判理论着眼去理解海德格尔的存在论思想。 关键字：海德格尔；座架；现代技术；存在论 Heidegger's theory of Technology on the base of Ontology Abstract：As a modern people who are live in the 20th century, Heidegger and modern technology in the world seem to have a natural diaphragm, he will continue to ask, and the causing of the human's existence predicament of root is not modern technology’s pros and cons, but the essence of modern technology is determined by the enframing ,this disclosing of the decision, his criticism of technology is established on his thinking of ontology, this paper mainly from Heidegger's ontology theory to grasp the critical theory of technology, and in turn from the critique of technology theory with an eye to understand Heidegger's ontological thought. Key words:Heidegger;Enframing;Modern technology ;Ontology 引言 在这个世界图象的时代中，人类的生活被日益强大的现代技术所支配着。随着技术的发展，人类的生存样态愈来愈丰富，活动的空间愈来愈广阔。现代人沉醉于技术进步所带来的各种物质利益中，为技术的每一个成就而欢心鼓舞。殊不知，我们已成为技术的傀儡。海德格尔对现代性的批判集中体现在他对近现代技术的批判上，他认为现代技术统治着人类的各个方面，已成了现代人面临的最高危险，他洞察到：现代性的根源恰恰存在于近现代世界里最为普遍而根本的技术现象里，他对技术的批判并不是对技术先现象的一种批判，而是针对技术的“本质”进行批判，在对传统的技术观进行追问的基础上，海德格尔发现现代技术的本质已经深深地遮蔽着，这种遮蔽源于人类对“存在”的遗忘。终生沉浸于对“存在”问题的沉思之中的的海德格尔，在一种对时代早己遗忘的东西的眷恋之情的激荡下开始了对技术本质的追问。
初探海德格尔《技术的追问》 论文导读：马丁·海德格尔（Martinheidegger，1889--1976）是二十世纪最有影响力的德籍西方思想家之一，从二十世纪三十年代开始，海德格尔一直深思科学技术并深切的关注着科学技术对人类生活的影响。在马克思看来，技术是人的创造物，技术的本质不过是人的本质力量的对象化，是人类征服和改造自然的劳动手段，是一种生产力。关键词：海德格尔，技术的本质，集置，现代技术 马丁·海德格尔（Martinheidegger，1889--1976）是二十世纪最有影响力的德籍西方思想家之一，从二十世纪三十年代开始，海德格尔一直深思科学技术并深切的关注着科学技术对人类生活的影响。众所周知，科学技术从根本上改变了人的生活方式和思维方式，技术作为一股强大的统治力量的无时无刻不在影响着人类的历史，人们一方面从技术发展中受益，同时也付出了极大的代价，海德格尔对于技术的批评，对于形成当代环境保护理念，具有非常重要的意义。1．海德格尔对技术本质的分析 1.1传统观念中的技术本质“技术术不同于技术的之本质，如果我们要寻求树的本质，我们一定会发觉，那个贯穿并且支配着每一棵树之为树的东西，本身并不是一棵树，一棵可以在平常的树木中间找到的树”[1]因此在追问技术本质中，技术的本质不是什么技术因素，当我们仅仅追问及表象和技术的因素，那么我们将会被技术所束缚，什么也就看不出来了。按照最为原始、古老的看法，“我们问技术是什么时，我们在追问技术，尽人皆知对我们这个问题有两种回答，其一曰：技术是何目的的手段。论文参考网。其二曰：技术是人的行为。论文参考网。”[2]，海德格尔把传统的观念称之为“流行观念”，海德格尔认为这种“流行观念”不过是工具的和人类学的技术规定，从某种角度讲是完全正确的，但是没有准确的解释技术的本质到底是什么？因为“正确的东西总是要在眼前讨论的东西中确定某个合适的东西，但是，这种确定要成为正确的，绝不需要揭示眼前讨论的东西的本质。”[3] 1.2技术不仅是一种手段了，而成为一种解蔽的方式单纯正确的东西并不一定是真实的东西，只有真实的东西才会把我们带入一种自由的关系中，这样我们才会揭示技术的本质所涉及的东西，既然要从技术的工具性规定出发来寻求答案，那么工具性的东西本身是什么？我们必须通过对技术的工具性来寻找技术的本质，工具是人们为了获得某物对其发生所用的手段，这就涉及到因果性的问题了。几百年来，哲学一直教导我们说，有四种原因：一是质料因，二是形式因，三是动力因，四是效果因，海德格尔认为，因果性与起作用是毫无关系的，我们所说的因果性只不过是招致另一种方式的东西，四因乃是联系在一起的招致方式，招致具有进入到达的启动的特征，在这种意义上，招致就是引发。海德格尔借助柏拉图《会饮篇》中的一句话告诉了我们招致带了什么？“对于总是从来不在场者向在场者过渡和发生的东西来说，每一种引发都是产出”[4]，产出又是如何发生地呢？产出是从遮蔽状态而来进入到无比状态中的，只是因为遮蔽者进入无蔽领域，产出才会发生。即产出就是基于解蔽。从追问技术的本质，到技术的工具性规定，然后到因果性，又牵涉到招致方式，最后到解蔽，那么这中间有什么关系呢？海德格尔认为“关系大矣”[5]首先招致的四种方式是因果性的四种原因，四原因中的质料因与目的因中含有工具性的东西，工具性的东西被看作是技术的最基本的特征，由招致到达产出，就来到解蔽，那么技术是工具，是手
胡塞尔与海德格尔的?本真?时间现象学 黑尔德 自从胡塞尔第一次将现象学引上道路并且海德格尔第一次对现象学进行彻底改造以来，时间便处在他们的思考中心。与对原初经验的现象学寻求相符，这两位思想家在时间理解上具有一个共同的基本区分：在所有哲学之前为我们所日常熟悉了的那种时间与一个原初地经验到的时间相对峙，海德格尔在他后期的报告?时间与存在?（1962年）中将后者称之为?本真的时间?。在?转向?后的思想中，他在这里和其他地方用?本真?(eigentlich)一词来标识这样一种?实事?(Sache)，即某种构成现象学的一个根本的争执区域的东西，它在那些对它而言原初是?本己的?东西中表明自身。[①] 据此，?本真时间?应当被理解为如其在对它来说是本己的东西中所显现出来的那种时间。在海德格尔的主要著作《存在与时间》（1927年）中，?本真?这个形容词已经具有了这个基本含义，但它原发地所涉及的?实事?在当时就是人的此在；被标识为?本真?的是那种此在在其中?决断地?接受它的?必死性?(Sterblichkeit)的生存方式。尽管海德格尔自三十年代以后放弃了对?本真?形容词的这种生存论分析的使用。但即使在?转向?之后它也仍然以隐蔽的方式在他的思想中继续起作用。我在后面还会回到这个问题上来。 无论是在《存在与时间》中、还是在以后的?时间与存在?中，?非本真的时间?都在于：时间对我们显现为各个当下、各个现在的次序(Folge)。这些?现在?可以在某些发生事情的时段(Phasen)上——用亚里士多德的话来说：在?各个运动?上——被计数(anz?hlen)，通过这种方式，对时间的自然科学理解也成为可能。自亚里士多德的时间定义以来，流行的——至少在西方文化中——便是这种把时间视为现在次序的观点，海德格尔在《存在与时间》中将这种时间观称作?庸俗的时间理解?。由于现在次序构成一个固定的形式，我们在其中遭遇到所有在时间中个体可定位的客体，因此这种时间在胡塞尔那里叫做?客观时间?。在由爱迪?施泰因所汇总的哥廷根时期的文字中，他把客观时间与?内意识?相对峙，在三十年代的后期手稿中，他把客观时间与?活的当下?相对峙。由于胡塞尔以此来标识时间原初在对它而言是本己的东西中被经验的方式，因此我们也可以说，在他那里也有本真的和非本真的时间
海德格尔的技术之思 摘要：技术是真理的发生方式。它作为工具就是发挥作用，而发挥作用以“带出”的可能性为前提。“带出”就是去蔽，是一种真理的发生方式。在真理的发生中，人并不是一个决定性的角色。他倾听并且应和存在的召唤，把自己向着敞开领域敞开，并在这种敞开中达到“自由”，这就是“此在”之“此”的意思。现代技术是技术时代的技术，是形而上学的完成形态，它是一种“挑起”的“去蔽”。古代技术汇聚起天地神人，保护着物之物性。现代技术向着现代工业体系“预置”一切，使物成为“持存物”。技术时代的人比物更原始的归属于“预置” 和“持存”。“预置”归属于其聚合“座架”。座架的神秘运作是存在历史的命运使然。 关键词：技术、形而上学、海德格尔Abstract: Technology is the arising way of truth. As a tool, it simply comes into
play, which presupposes the possibility of “bring-forth” (poiesis). Bring-forth is revelation, and a kind of way for truth to arise. In the arising of truth, human being doesn’t play a decisive part. Man listens attentively and responds heartily to summons of Being, and open oneself wide towards the open realm. By doing so, he reaches the realm of Freedom. This is what “Da” of “Dasein” means. Modern technology is one that is in technological age and a dominant way of revelation. In the sense of revelation, ancient technics is a sort of “bring-forth” (poiesis), while modern technology is a sort of “challenging” (Heraufordern). The former put the heaven, earth, god and man together, by which it protects the thingness of thing, while the latter “setting-in-order” (bestellen) everything towards modern industrial
海德格尔的主要哲学观点试析海德格尔的技术观哲学论文 [摘要]海德格尔通过对技术的追问阐发了现代人“无家可归”的病因，分析了技术时 代人类面临的种种危机。同时。海德格尔又通过他独特的语言观和艺术观提出了拯救的可 能性。海德格尔对技术本质的追问和对语言、艺术的沉思，都既具有其合理意义又具有明 显的局限性。 [关键词]海德格尔；技术观；语言观；艺术观 20世纪以来，现代技术获得前所未有的迅猛发展，其所发挥的威力更是深刻地改变了人类的社会生活。今天，技术正变成全球性的力量，渗入人类生活的各个层面，染指人类 历史的根基。同时，技术水平的提高和人类生存质量的改善并不总是成正比的。技术对文 化整体的深远影响，不能不令人深思。对此问题的有效回答涉及到对现代西方文化的评价。海德格尔正是从这一视角开始了他的技术之思。 一 海德格尔关于技术的思考及其所发表的论著主要集中于第二次世界大战前后，主要都 是由他的一系列演讲整理而成的，并于1971年结集出版，名为《关于技术的追问》。其 中主要的文章有两篇，即写于1949年的《关于技术的追问》，1954年的《科学和反思》。 科学技术在人类历史的发展过程中，尤其是在近现代社会的建构过程中，起着极其重 要的推动作用。科学技术所提供的思维方式、理论模型、先进设备，都为现代社会提供了 强有力的精神和物质基础。然而人们也意识到，与技术水平日益提高相伴随的却是人类生 存家园的屡遭破坏，残酷的现实促使人们反思：既然技术被认为是人类用以达到自己目的 的手段，为什么它反而成了人难以控制甚至人反受其控制的力量?换言之，技术的本质究 竟是什么? 在海德格尔看来，人们在从事技术活动的过程中是并不需要关心技术的本质问题的。 因此，对技术的本质进行追问，这显然是一个技术之外的哲学问题。经过一系列艰深的推 理论证，海德格尔认为：在古希腊时期，技术曾作为一种技艺和艺术，是一种认识方式， 一种让显露的方式，使“存在物从遮蔽中而特地进入其显象的显露中去，techne技术，从来不指制作活动”。然而，随着现代化技术突飞猛进的发展，由于人们对它的偏执误解和 滥用，海德格尔认为，情况正在发生变化，准确地说，技术正在被扭曲： 首先，技术已变成一种“限定”s tellen。“限定意味着：从某一方面去取用某物从 氮的方向去取用空气，从矿石的方向去取用土地，把某物确定在某物上，固定在某物上， 定位在某物上。”海德格尔举例说，水电厂被置于莱茵河水流之中，它把莱茵河水流限定 在水压上。这样一来，莱茵河在技术时代只作为水压提供者而呈现出来的面貌，就与诗人 荷尔德林眼中的莱茵河完全不同了。海德格尔认为，在技术时代，不仅人限定了事物，而 且人本身也完全受制于技术的视野。
2010年5月 第27卷第3期 云南民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版) Journal of Yunnan Na tio na lities Un i versity (Social Sc i ences)Vol 127,No 12M ay .2010 =收稿日期>2009-12-23 =作者简介>11卢云昆(1955-),男,5云南大学学报(社科版)6主编,编审。 21朱松峰(1976-),男,中南财经政法大学讲师,哲学博士。 论胡塞尔对早期海德格尔思想的影响 卢云昆1 ,朱松峰 2 (11云南大学,云南昆明650091;21中南财经政法大学,湖北武汉430060) 摘 要:胡塞尔在以下的三个方面对早期海德格尔的思想产生了深刻的影响:首先,为早期海德格尔显示了一种前理论的体验生活世界的可能性;其次,为早期海德格尔前理论地探讨/存在0问题指出了方向;另外,为早期海德格尔显明了一种/流动的存在0和言说它的方式。然而,1927年5存在与时间6的问世,却从根本上表征着海德格尔的思想与胡塞尔的思想已经开始分道扬镳。对于这一颇具震撼力的/哲学事件0,西方学界当时的大多数看法是海德格尔完成了一场/最伟大的哲学革命0,在我国的/海学研究0领域,很多学者也大致持有同样的观点,故而胡塞尔对海德格尔早期思想的影响变得晦暗不明了。应该重提和重视胡塞尔对海德格尔早期思想的重要影响,以期明晓一种学术思想的/知识谱系0是如何相互关联而又各自保留其/自足性0的。 关键词:前理论的;存在;流动;表述;形式指引/形式显示=中图分类号>B16154 =文献标识码>A =文章编号>1672-867X (2010)03-0093-05 海德格尔于1909年就开始研读胡塞尔的5逻 辑研究6,并期望能借此推进对存在问题的研究与解决。因此,其博士论文和教职论文中也都明显带有现象学的痕迹。在1915年写的一份个人简历中,海德格尔回忆说:/胡塞尔的5逻辑研究6对我的 学术发展产生了决定性的影响。0[1] 1916年,胡塞尔来到弗莱堡大学,两人开始了真正的思想交流。在1923年夏季学期的讲座中,海德格尔坦承了这种交流对其思想发展的影响:在我的研究道路上,/胡塞尔为我开了眼界0[2] 。可见,胡塞尔对1924年以前的早期海德格尔的影响是显然的、深刻的。但是,由于对早期海德格尔这段时期思想的不甚了解与重视,国内学者对此的论述与研究的成果也不算多。因此,很多事关重大的问题均被有意无意地/遮蔽0了,故而本文试图通过对某些问题的清理,尽可能地将胡塞尔对早期海德格尔思想的影响彰显出来。并以此求教于各位专家学者。一、作为一种前理论的体验生活世界的可能性根据胡塞尔的意向性理论,意向性作为意识活动的基本特征,意味着/意指-被意指0的结构内在地蕴含在所有的意识活动之中。在这些活动的进行过程中,我们根本就不会意识到其中有一个作为意向关系之中心点的自我,亦即/我们可以说 是生活在有关行为之中0[3] 。而只有在对这些活动和行为的过后反思中,我们才会关注到一个作为主体的纯粹自我、一个作为我之对象的客体,以及两者之间的对立。 进而,胡塞尔自然态度的世界理论又重申,每个人首先都朴素地生活在世界之中,从事着各种实践活动,并不是一个进行着理论观察的人;而世界也并非是一个/纯事物0的客体对象,且是一个我们生活于其中的、充满了意义的世界。/意识不只是一般体验,而不如说是有意义的-体验.。0[4] 并且,这意义不是我们后来赋予纯事物的,而是它们本来就有的,所以我们一上手就把它们经验为有意义的存在者。换言之,这是一个前理论的体验生活世界,它/先于一切理论0(vor a ller /Theo 2 rie 0),并/对理论保持严格的距离0[4] 。由此,一切命题和判断无非都是以理论反思的方式,对自然态度及其世界进行扭变的结果。而且,胡塞尔也认识到,这种理论反思的活动只不过是追求着、活动着的生活的一种特殊方式而已,情感和意志活动也有其自身的价值。 而在早期海德格尔看来,/实际生活经验0具有/自足性0、/不触目性0、/意蕴性0的特征。这些特征意味着,在实际生活中,我们与生活自身之间没有绝对的距离,内与外的区分在这里毫无意 ) 93)
海德格尔 海德格尔2010-11-30 15：56人物简介马丁·海德格尔是二十世纪一位重 要的哲学家。海德格尔指出西方哲学自从柏拉图便误解存在的意思，去研究个 别存在的问题而不去研究存在本身的问题。换句话说，海德格尔相信所有对存 在的探讨焦点放在个别存在物/实体及其性质。对于海德格尔来说，一个对存在更可信的分析是查探已经了解的存在物的基础或者促成存在物如实体展现的背 后基础。但是自从哲学家都忽略了这个更基本理论前期的存在，并且以此推导 其他理论，错把那些理论在各处应用，终于混淆我们对存在及人类存在的理解。为免这些深层误解，海德格尔相信哲学的探求应该新方式来进行，重踏哲学历 史足迹，一步一步出发。 二十世纪三十年代中期起,海德格尔开始了对西方哲学史的系统性的阐释。他从现象学的、解释学的、存在论的角度研究了一些重要哲学家的著作，并且 试图将这些著作未被思考过的前提和偏见展示出来。根据海德格尔的说法,所有至今的哲学蓝图,都是对世界的单向度的理解，这种单向度,他认为是所有形而 上学的标志。 按照海德格尔的观点，这种形而上学的对世界的理解,在现代"技术"中达到了顶峰。"技术"这个概念,他不仅理解成一种中性的用来达到目的的手段，而且他试图去展示：通过技术,我们对世界的理解也发生了变化。 根据他的观点，由于技术,我们从实用的角度,去看待地球。由于技术的全 球性传播,和毫无节制的对自然资源的利用，海德格尔在技术中看到了一种不可抗拒的危险。 他把艺术看成是技术的对立面，并且从三十年代末开始，他根据荷尔德林 的诗,领会到了对于单纯的技术性的世界关联方式的替代方式。 海德格尔曾尝试引领哲学家脱离形而上学及知识论的问题而朝向本体论的 问题。这就是存在的意义。
三 在描述了海德格尔早期的真理概念以及相关的存在真理问题之后，我们现在要将目光转向他的存在本身的问题以及与此相关的无敝问题。在这里值得注意的是，海德格尔在1969年不只是在术语上修改了他对存在真理的理解；而且他同时还表露出一个基本主张，即：追问存在真理固然有意义，但那是已经为黑格尔和胡塞尔所追问过的问题，而真正的存在问题在他之前还没有被任何人接触到，这就是作为存在的存在（参见：SD，77）。本文在开始时曾以这样一个对立的问题开始：为什 么我们既可以说，胡塞尔接近了本真的存在问题，同时又可以说，在胡塞尔那里没有存在问题。对这个问题，现在可以有一个海德格尔意义上的答案：胡塞尔虽然提出了存在者存在的问题，但没有提出存在本身的问题，后一个问题是前一个问题的基础。 后面的论述将会表明，与存在本身的问题有关的是胡塞尔的另一个存在概念，即系词意义上的存在。但我们事先要论及的是胡塞尔的范畴直观。实际上我们在至此为止的分析中还没有讨论到，胡塞尔的范畴直观对海德格尔的影响究竟何在。 如前所述，当胡塞尔在谈及作为范畴直观对象的存在时，他指的是不再是真理意义上的存在，而是系词意义上的存在。这个意义上的存在是关系行为的意向相关项，而关系行为（两束以上的多束行为）奠基于素朴行为（单束的行为）之中，例如对?椅子是黄的?的实事状态感知奠基于对?椅子?的实事感知之中，这个情况决定了范畴直观必定奠基于素朴直观之中。 海德格尔在这里并不完全同意胡塞尔的观点。虽然他也谈到范畴直观在素朴直观中的奠基等等，但是，如果存在被理解为连系词，那么他的真正看法在于，?原本的东西是关系本身，通过这种关系，关系环节自身才得以明确?，关系要比关系环节?更本真?（GA 20，86）。——当然，这还不是海德格尔和胡塞尔之间的真正分歧所在。 就系词意义上的存在概念而言，海德格尔在《时间概念历史导引》中似乎还没有明确地表露出他与胡塞尔的分歧。他在这里主要是赞同并引用胡塞尔的说法：?实事状态和（系词意义上的）存在这两个概念的起源并不处在对判断或对判断充实的‘反思’之中，而是真实地处在‘判断充实本身’之中；我们不是在作为对象的行为之中，而是在这些行为的对象之中找到实现这些概念的抽象基础?。海德格尔对此阐释说，?‘存在’……不是意识方面的东西，而是某些行为的相关项?。[i][xxv]将系词意义上的存在看作是某些行为（即范畴直观行为或关系直观行为）的相关项，这个表述以后在海德格尔那里难得见到。 可以说，在1925年《时间概念历史导引》中，海德格尔首先看到的是胡塞尔在存在问题上（作为系词的存在方面）的功绩，就像他在七十年代回顾这一问题时所指出的那样：?借助于那些范畴直观分析，胡塞尔把存在从它在判断上的固定状态中解放出来。?（VS，115）在胡塞尔之后，存在不再是判断的对象，而是可以直接感知到的东西：?只有当某个存在现实地或想像地被置于我们眼前时，存在的概念才能够产生出来。?（LU II/2，A614/B2142）这里所说的?置于眼前?当然是指 特殊的范畴感知。而海德格尔在这点上的主要获益在于，他?终于有了一个基地：‘存在’不是一个单纯的概念，不是一个通过推论而产生的纯粹的抽象?（VS，116）。 但胡塞尔在?存在?问题上的漫不经心是显而易见的：在分析范畴直观的进程中，他